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Abstract 
Two Visions of the Nation-State: A Comparative Analysis of Heinrich von Treitschke 
and Ernest Renan's Conceptions of the Nation-State and Nationality. 
Paul Sischy 
In the late nineteenth century, the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke and 
the French historian Ernest Renan proposed competing conceptions of the nation-state 
and nationality. Treitschke's organicist conception saw nation-states as primordial 
entities that have permanent characteristics and whose interests stood above those of the 
individual. Renan's voluntarist conception saw nation-states as modern entities entered 
into on an individual basis, which were not defined according to an ethno-linguistic 
criterion. This thesis analyzes these conceptions as they were put forth in Treitschke's 
and Renan's primary works on the subject, as well as in their responses to the Franco-
Prussian war (1870-71) and Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which Treitschke 
supported and Renan opposed. Lastly, it examines the relationship of Treitschke's and 
Renan's conceptions of the nation-state to the dominant historical discourses of each 
historian's respective country. In doing so, it demonstrates that Treitschke's thought was 
consistently guided by his belief that humanity is unequal and that the interests of the 
nation-state exist as the highest ideal. For Treitschke the essence of the nation-state lay 
in its ability to express its will either through the submission of its members or in its 
interaction with other nation-states. In contrast, Renan's thought is guided by his belief 
that humanity is the highest ideal and that international relations should be guided 
according to this ideal. Whereas Treitschke's conception of the nation-state was 
reflective of nineteenth century German historiography, Renan's was less so with respect 
to French historiography of the period. 
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IV 
Introduction 
In the historiography of nationalism studies, the longest standing debate over what 
constitutes a nation is between a "voluntarist" and "organicist" understanding of the 
nation. Generally speaking, the voluntarist conception of the nation "regarded the nation 
as a free association of rational human beings entered voluntarily on an individual 
basis."1 In contrast, the organic type viewed the nation as "an organism of fixed and 
indelible character which was stamped on its members at birth and from which they could 
never free themselves."2 Thus, organic nationalism 
holds that the world consists of natural nations, and has always done so; 
that nations are the bedrock of history and the chief actors in the historical 
drama; that nations and their characters are organisms that can easily be 
ascertained by their cultural differentiae; that the members of nations may, 
and frequently have, lost their national self-consciousness along with their 
independence; and that the duty of nationalists is to restore that self-
consciousness and independence to the 'reawakened' organic nation. 
In contrast, the voluntarist conception of the nation views nations as modern entities and 
generally finds every tenet held by organic nationalists as "questionable, if not 
unacceptable."4 In the voluntarist conception of the nation: 
The world does not consist of'natural' nations, except thinking makes it 
so, nor are nations to be likened to evolving organisms; on the contrary 
nations and nationality are logically and historically contingent 
phenomena. Before the modern epoch, nations were largely unknown and 
human beings had a multiplicity of collective loyalties; religious 
communities, cities, empires and kingdoms were the chief collective 
actors, above all the village and district level, and the outlook of most 
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and 








human beings were strictly local. Nor is it easy to define the character and 
ascertain the cultural differentiae of many nations in the contemporary 
world, given the multiplicity of overlapping identities in which individuals 
are enmeshed.5 
According to Anthony D. Smith, a leading expert in the field of nationalism 
studies,6 the conceptions of the nation-state and nationality as put forth, in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, by the French historian, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), and the 
German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), represent the locus classicus for 
the debate between the voluntarist and organicist understanding of the nation.7 
This debate first took form during the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871) in which 
Germany annexed the French provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. For Treitschke, the 
annexation of the French provinces was justified according to an ethno-linguistic, hence 
organicist, conception of the nation and nationality. Renan's voluntarist conception of 
the nation and nationality, as outlined in his 1882 lecture What is a nation?, was 
delivered in response to Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and sought to 
discredit the ethno-linguistic conception of the nation as a basis for territorial expansion. 
Thus, historians of nationalism have frequently presented Treitschke's and Renan's work 
as an intellectual debate between two competing visions of the nation-state and 
nationality though for varying purposes. 
5
 Ibid. 
Anthony D. Smith is the author of numerous works on nationalism and the historiography of nationalism 
studies. He has been described as "the leading specialist on nationalism." As quoted by Ernest Gellner. 
"Do Nations Have Navels?," The Warwick Debates on Nationalism. Held in Coventry, GB, 24 October 
1995, in Nationality and Nationalism, ed. Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2004), 432. 
7 
Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(Hanover: New England U.P., 2000), 11. 
2 
The first to do so was Hans Kohn in his influential work The Idea of Nationalism 
(1944), which was written and published at the height of the Second World War.8 Kohn 
presented Treitschke's and Renan's competing views as indicative of two ideological 
versions of nationalism. Whereas Renan's voluntarist conception was representative of 
the nationalism most prevalent in the West, that is to say, west of the Rhine, in countries 
such as France, the Low Countries, and especially Britain and America, Treitschke's 
organicist view, was indicative of the dominant type of nationalisms of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and much of Asia.9 
Likewise, in 1966, Otto Pflanze contended that Treitschke and Renan's 
perspectives were indicative of a "basic dualism in European thought upon the subject of 
nationality" which he believed was the product of two varying historical experiences to 
the east and west of the Rhine.10 Pflanze argued that the "Atlantic world" witnessed the 
rise of "state-nations" meaning "the idea of the nation developed within the chrysalis of 
the state." In this phenomenon, "common sovereignty provided common institutions and 
a common political tradition from which emerged a sense of nationhood which 
transcended cultural differences."11 In contrast, central and eastern Europe witnessed the 
rise of "nation-states" in which "the idea of the nation could only develop within the 
chrysalis of the individual culture, for here ethnic groups were either radically divided 
Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background (New Brunswick N.J: 
Transaction Publishers, 1944), 581-582. 
9 
Ibid, 3-24. Smith, The Nation in History, 6-7. For Kohn on Treitschke see, Hans Kohn, Prophets and 
Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), 106-
130. Kohn's dichotomy between Western and Eastern nationalisms has been heavily criticized for its 
moralistic exaggeration of the distinction, its geographical focus, which overlooked important exceptions 
and its over-sharp delineation of the two types of nationalism. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, 
Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 40. 
10




into many political fragments" or "totally contained within the frontiers of great 
empires." In these cases, Pflanze argued, the "nation was first defined as a cultural rather 
than a political entity. The growth of national consciousness created a demand for the 
creation of the "nation-state."12 Moreover, Pflanze saw Treitschke and Renan's 
opposing conceptions of the nation-state and nationality as reflective of a "cleavage" in 
European intellectual culture. Whereas Renan's conception of the nation and nationality 
was indicative of the western European tradition of popular sovereignty in which national 
identity was based upon a sense of mutual identity arising from a common past and the 
expectation of a common future, Treitschke's thought was representative of central and 
eastern Europe which saw nationality as an "objective force whose unceasing motion 
produces the unique culture of each nation."13 
More recent historians of nationalism have continued to cite Treitschke and 
Renan's opposing views on the nation-state and nationality though, unlike Kohn or 
Pflanze their treatments have analyzed their work, particularly Renan's, in a 
historiographical context.14 In this context, Treitschke's and Renan's opposing 
conceptions of the nation-state and nationality are viewed as some of the earliest 
expressions of theoretical investigations into the twin phenomena of nations and 
nationalism in a field which only began to recognize itself as such in the 1960s.15 Thus, 
contemporary analyses of Treitschke's and Renan's debate have focused on the different 
motivations behind their investigations into the question of nations and nationalism and 
12
 Ibid, 139-140. 
13
 Ibid, 140. 
14 
Renan's "What is a nation?" has been reprinted in several different compendiums on nationalism and 
theories of nationalism. These include Ernest Renan, "What is a nation?," in Nationality and Nationalism, 
ed. Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby, 27-40; Ernest Renan, "What is a nation? " trans, Martin Thom, in 
Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 8-23. 
Stuart Woolf, ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present (New York: Routledge, 1996), 5. 
4 
how and why their intentions differ from more recent theories. As Smith, writes, these 
early commentaries on the principle of nationality were "written with specific political 
developments in mind [and] there [was] no attempt to fashion a general theory applicable 
to all cases, or to resolve the antinomies of each issue in a coherent and systematic 
manner."16 Rather, as Paul Lawrence points out, "interest in nationalism at this stage was 
largely ethical and philosophical. Instead of searching for underlying causes or general 
trends, the scholars of the period were more concerned with the merits and defects of the 
doctrine than with the spread of national phenomena."17 Moreover, "not only did many 
authors range themselves for or against the abstract doctrine of nationalism, but most 
were writing in active support of, or opposition to, specific nationalisms."18 
Indeed, this is true of both Treitschke's and Renan's discussions on nationality. 
Treitschke's conception of the nation-state and nationality was completely oriented by his 
political motives and as this thesis will demonstrate his discussion on these issues was 
tailored to meet what he saw as the political demands of the day. Renan's discussion on 
the nation-state and nationality was also motivated by political demands, namely what he 
saw as the threat of ethnographic politics. Yet, his conception of the nation and 
nationality, while euro-centric, was one of "the first to aspire to an analytical 
methodology" meaning his investigation was more methodical as it looked at the rise and 
meaning of several nations and nationalities as they existed throughout Europe.19 Lastly, 
contemporary historians of nationalism, such as Smith and Lawrence, have presented 
Treitschke's and Renan's contrasting views as an actual debate. In their rendering, 
Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 10. 
17 
Paul Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Limited, 2005), 17. 
18 
Ibid, 18. Author's emphasis. 
19 
Ibid, 36. Author's emphasis. 
5 
Renan's What is a nation? lecture was intended as a direct critique of Treitschke 
personally.20 While undoubtedly the intent of Renan's speech was to discredit the 
particularly German organicist view of the nation and nationality, of which Treitschke 
was a leading exponent, the research undertaken in the writing of this thesis was unable 
to produce any explicit reference whereby Renan stated that the intent of his work was 
directed at Treitschke personally. Thus, in this thesis Treitschke's and Renan's 
opposing views on the nation-state and nationality will be treated as a conceptual debate 
in which each writer's position, while opposing the other, did not directly reference the 
other by name. 
This thesis employs a comparative approach. Its intention is to provide a more 
complete analysis of Treitschke's and Renan's discussions on the nation-state and 
nationality than have appeared in the historiography of this debate. Chapters one and two 
analyze Treitschke's and Renan's conceptions of the nation-state and nationality, 
respectively, as they were put forth in their main works on the subject. Chapters three 
and four examine Treitschke's and Renan's responses to the events of the Franco-
Prussian war and the question of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Chapter five 
analyzes Treitschke's and Renan's conceptions of the nation-state and nationality 
In Smith's words, Renan "delivered [his speech] to counter the militarist nationalism of Heinrich 
Treitschke." Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 9. Smith describes the debate as such in numerous 
works, The Nation in History, 11.; Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, 36. Paul Lawrence, makes a 
similar claim stating that Renan's What is a nation? was both a response to the "ongoing territorial disputes 
over the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine" and "was also, in part, a direct response and challenge to the work 
of Treitschke and his theoretical justifications of national expansion." Lawrence, Nationalism: History and 
Theory, 34. 
21 
When asked to clarify his references to Renan's speech as such Smith stated that to his knowledge 
Renan's speech was not directed specifically at Treitschke personally. On this same matter, Lawrence was 
unable to provide a definitive answer stating that he could not locate the source from which he based his 
claim. Anthony D. Smith "RE: Question concerning Renan's What is a Nation? for Prof. Smith." Email to 
Paul Sischy. 21 June 2007. Paul Lawrence "RE: Question concerning Renan's What is a nation?." Email 
to Paul Sischy. 27 June 2007. 
6 
according to the historiographical climate in which they were produced as well the 
philosophical foundations that guided German and French historiography in the 
nineteenth century. The conclusion will examine Treitschke's and Renan's discussions 
comparatively and discuss the fundamental differences between their two views. 
In doing so, this thesis will demonstrate that Treitschke put the will of the nation-
state above the will of the individual. This is evident in his identification of the state as 
power and according to the ethno-linguistic criteria by which he identified nationality. 
Moreover, Treitschke's position was rooted in his view of humankind as fundamentally 
unequal and of the existence of the state as the highest ideal of human history. 
Treitschke's views were reflective of philosophical positions that were common within 
the German historical discourse in the nineteenth century. With regard to Renan, this 
thesis will demonstrate that Renan believed that nationality was defined by the 
individual's will. Unlike Treitschke, Renan held humanity as the highest ideal which he 
believed should guide international relations and exist as superior to national aspirations. 
Renan's views, while representative of some elements of nineteenth century French 
historiography, were fundamentally opposed to others. Both, Treitschke and Renan's 
discussions on the nation-state and nationality were oriented by their fundamental beliefs 
and thus served as the basis for their positions. 
7 
Chapter One: Heinrich von Treitschke and the nation-state 
Treitschke's views on the nation-state and nationality are best represented in his 
work, Politics, first published in two volumes in 1897-98 following his death in 1896. 
The work is based upon a course of the same name Treitschke taught throughout his 
academic career and was compiled and carefully collated from the notebooks of more 
than a dozen of his students.1 Consequently, Politics has a peculiar quality in both its 
structure and substance as the notes it consulted span a range of over twenty years. Thus, 
as Treitschke's foremost biographer, Andreas Dorpalen, suggests, Politics should be 
"read with some care" as "different layers of [Treitschke's] thinking have been processed 
into one account, incorporating ideas which he did not hold at all times."2 Nevertheless, 
the "gist of the work," Dorpalen writes, "is no doubt accurate" and serves as the clearest 
example of his view of the nation-state.3 
It should be noted that in its book form Politics does not adequately evoke the 
experience of Treitschke's lectures for the course. The course resembled more of a 
"solemn ceremony" than a conventional university lecture and proved to be the most 
popular the University of Berlin offered. Those in attendance included students from all 
of the university's departments as well as writers, editors, German officers and 
Treitschke first gave the course at the University of Freiburg in 1863 and repeated the course every year 
during the twenty-two years he taught in Berlin beginning in 1875-1876. Hans Kohn, Prophets and 
Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism, 129. Konrad H. Jarausch, Students, Society, and 
Politics in Imperial Germany (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 208. 




professionals and high-school students.4 Dorpalen describes the experience of 
Treitschke's lectures as the following: 
The auditorium would be filled long before the appointed hour, the front 
benches occupied by an enthusiastic claque of upperclassmen and junior 
officers and officials. Treistchke would come in, followed by a number of 
his colleagues who would sit on special chairs on the lecture platform. 
Every few moments wild bursts of clapping and stamping, the German 
student's traditional sign of approval, would punctuate his oration. And 
when he had finished, his colleagues, like a guard of honor, would escort 
him from the classroom to the thunderous applause of the audience.5 
In the reminiscences of Treitschke's students one can sense what Dorpalen describes as 
the "militancy, the assertiveness, the frenzy of these lectures which made them so 
memorable and so fateful an experience."6 As one student noted, Treitschke's "delivery 
was kind of howling without period and comma, in a wave like rhythm which did not 
correspond to the meaning of his sentences . . . It took a while until you understood 
him."7 Yet, the same student attests to Treitschke's eloquence and the effect his 
oratorical style had upon his listeners: 
Without haste, yet literally without rest, he would pour out from the 
treasure of an inexhaustible vocabulary a continuous stream of language 
every sentence in perfect construction as though read from one of his 
books. He never faltered unless overcome by feeling, for his passions 
were vehement. Beginning his lecture directly he had ascended the 
rostrum, he gave you no breathing space until he had spoken his full three-
quarters of an hour or hour and a half, as the case might be, and then 
suddenly and without warning the voice ceased, and a moment later he 
disappeared. Yet a more finished, more concise, more logical manner of 
address was seldom heard.8 
4




 Ibid, 228. 
7




These Berlin lectures, in which Treitschke would attempt to indoctrinate his 
listeners with his "teutomanic, imperialist and anti-Semitic ideas,"9 were widely attended 
by the future elites of Wilhelmine Germany including Heinrich Class, later the head of 
the Pan-German League, Alfred von Tirpitz, the creator of the German Imperial Navy, 
and the sociologist Max Weber.10 "No historian," writes Jarausch, "exerted a comparable 
influence on the leading stratum of the German Empire."11 According to Kohn, 
Treitschke's notoriety during his academic career and his subsequent legacy as the 
preeminent "national prophet" of German society in the late nineteenth century stems, as 
much or more, from the fiery lectures he delivered in his Politics courses as from his 
written historical works, since these lectures represented the "most important single 
vehicle for spreading Treitschke's ideas."12 The course's stated aim was to inspire 
German youth everywhere and through it Treitschke became the "most influential 
political lecturer of the German Empire." Thus, Politics had a stated political purpose. 
Undoubtedly, Treitschke conceived of his ideas as an "academic rationale for 
Bismarckian Realpolitik" and as justifications for the expansion of the German Empire.14 
More generally, Jarausch states, Politics represents a "sustained diatribe against the 
Stefan Berger, The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany 
Since 1800, (Providence: Berghan Books, 1997), 30. 
10
 Dorpalen, Treitschke, 234,239. 
Jarausch, Students, Society, and Politics, 209. 
12 
Hans Kohn, introduction to Politics, by Heinrich von Treitschke (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1963), xii. 
Jarausch, Students, Society, and Politics, 209. 
14 
Ibid, 211. Dorpalen, Treitschke, 227. Treitschke saw the expansion of the German empire as a necessity: 
"All great nations in the fullness of their strength have desired to set their mark upon barbarian lands. All 
over the globe today we see the peoples of Europe creating a mighty aristocracy of the white races. Those 
who take no share in this great rivalry will play a pitiable part in time to come. The colonizing impulse has 
become a vital question for a great nation." Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics: abridged, edited, and with an 
introduction by Hans Kohn: Translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille. (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1963), 64. 
10 
Democratic tradition in Central Europe." Indeed, Treitschke was enormously disdainful 
of the democratic principle, as he scorned parliamentarianism and denounced what he 
referred to as the "democratic tyranny (majority rule)."16 Yet, Treitschke also proposed 
that Politics was representative of basic historical laws and moral imperatives, which 
while serving his political platform were also truths in themselves. Politics, Tretischke 
stated, 
sought to recognize the basic concepts of the state by looking at the real 
political world, to scrutinize historically what nations have desired, 
created, and achieved in political life, and [to probe] the causes; thereby it 
shal l . . . also succeed in finding some historical laws and in erecting 
moral imperatives. 
The means by which Treitschke attempted to arrive at this outcome was through his 
conception of the state, which in Politics functions as the works overarching premise. 
Essentially, Treitschke viewed the state as the dominant power in society as it alone acts 
as a legal, military and moral authority. As such Treitschke demanded that the state's 
interests were superior to individual interests and that citizens had to submit to the state's 
will to ensure that its power was preserved. Thus, Treitschke's discussion of the nation 
and nationality are all incorporated into his conception of the state. This conception will 
be the subject of this chapter. 
Treitschke defines the state as "the people, legally united as an independent 
entity."10 By "people" he means "a number of families permanently living side by 




Treitschke, Politics, 3. 
11 
side."19 Treitschke contends that this "definition implies that the State is primordial and 
necessary, that it is enduring as history, and no less essential to mankind than speech."20 
Treitschke's use of the term "primordial", thereby implying that states have existed from 
time immemorial, is based upon a rationale which views humankind as "historical 
being(s)," born with an inherent sense of "political genius," which expressed itself in the 
91 
creation of primitive forms of states. These states were composed out of ethnic groups 
99 
or what Treitschke terms "blood relationships." "Aboriginal families" were the first 
examples of these groups and the domination of the father or "chief over these groups 
represented the earliest example of what Treitschke terms, the "political principle of 
subordination."23 For Treitschke, the importance of the political principle of 
subordination is that it confirms that the "strength" or power of the state is based on what 
he terms humans' "positive rights" by which he means our base instincts.24 Thus, 
Treitschke's argument is that in its origins humankind organized itself into primitive 
forms of states and that this process is representative of humankind's natural 
development. Furthermore, these primitive groupings existed as ethnic enclaves distinct 
from one another. From this example Treitschke concludes: "The assertion that mankind 






Ibid. Indeed, Treitschke contends that man's political capacity is an inherent quality: "Man is driven by 
his political instinct to construct a constitution as inevitably as he constructs language." Ibid, 5. 
22 
Ibid, 6. Treitschke contends that the division of people into distinct ethnic groups was the natural result 
of the human need to procreate. Thus, the assumption is that humans only sought to procreate amongst 
those of the same race. Ibid, 5-6. 
23
 Ibid, 5. 
2 4
 Ibid, 6. 
12 
cannot be otherwise conceived than as constituted in small groups; that is the primitive 
form of the small State."25 
Thus, Treitschke contends that the example of the primordial state is evidence that 
humankind's natural tendency is to not perceive of itself as part of a greater collective 
humanity in which individuals, despite their many differences, are seen as fundamentally 
equal. According to Treitschke the conjoined concepts of "humanity" and the "natural 
equality of man" were decidedly unnatural as they relate to humankind's historical and 
political development.26 It is both "historically and physiologically untrue", states 
Treitschke "that human beings enter upon existence first as men, and afterwards as 
compatriots."27 Treitschke contends that modern national consciousness is reflective of 
this process, "as a man feels himself primarily a German or a Frenchman and only in the 
second place as a man in the wider sense."28 Thus, for Treitschke human history had 
enacted itself in such a way that one's political consciousness, manifested as a national 
identity, had preceded any belief in a shared sense of humanity. 
Treitschke proposes that the notion of humanity was introduced by the rise of 
Christianity and Christ's message of the universal brotherhood of man.29 This message, 
he argues, did not come naturally to humankind but rather "has to be assimilated through 
doctrine and education."30 Thus, Treitschke's argument is that the primordial character 
25
 Ibid. 
As stated previously, Treitschke saw historical and political developments as coterminous processes. 
27 
Treitschke, Politics, 6. 
28
 Ibid, 6. 
2 9
 Ibid, 6. 
30 
Ibid, 6. Treitschke's rejection of the Christian precept of'the brotherhood of man' was not a wholesale 
rejection of Christianity. Treitschke saw Christianity as a necessary condition in the life of the state as it 
acts as a safeguard against the state's influence over its citizen's individual consciences. The importance of 
Christianity, Treitschke argues, was that it secured that "man cannot be a mere member of the State, the 
recognition of the immortal and individual soul in every man, and of man's right to think freely concerning 
13 
of the state, in which humankind grouped itself along ethnic lines, and the enactment of 
the principle of political subordination-the domination of one group over another-
demonstrates that mankind is essentially unequal. The result, he contends is that "all 
political thinking [must] postulate [man's] natural inequality, for only thus is the 
subordination of some groups to others to be explained."31 
Following this line of reasoning Trietschke contends that if a people's innate 
political capacity is "to be further developed, it is quite inaccurate to call the State a 
necessary evil."32 Rather, he states: "The evolution of the State is, broadly speaking, 
nothing but the necessary outward form which the inner life of a people bestows upon 
itself, and that peoples attain to that form of government which their moral capacity 
enables them to reach."33 Therefore, in Treitschke's view, the life of the state represents 
the highest ideals a people can aspire to. Consequently, the state, Treitschke contends, is 
a moral community:34 "The State is a moral community; it is called upon to make 
positive efforts for the education of the human race, and its final aim is that a people may 
shape for themselves a real character in it, and by means of it."35 
God and divine things."30 Thus, Treitschke's rejection of Christianity is limited to its universal belief that 
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Thus, Treitschke contends that the evolution of the state, is "inherently necessary" 
for humankind. As such its laws and mores should be seen as both a representation of the 
"objectively revealed Will of God" as well as "the power of genius or of creative Will in 
history."36 "Only through [the State]" Treitschke contends, can a people's "moral 
development be perfected, for the living sense of citizenship inspires the community in 
the same way as a sense of duty inspires the individual." 7 Therefore, in Treitschke's 
view, the state functions as the vehicle through which a people's best moral energies can 
express themselves. 
A fundamental component of Treitschke's conception of the state is his view of 
the state as an individual. Essentially, Treitschke transfers the individuality normally 
accorded to the individual to the state itself.38 Thus, as an individual, the state, 
Treitschke contends, has a corresponding unique personality, which possesses permanent 
characteristics. Moreover, much like an individual has a corresponding will that exists as 
independent from any other so too can the same claim be made for the state. Treitschke 
contends that the state's individuality resides in it being the only force within society that 
can administer justice and wage war. 
In regards to the state's legal function, Treitschke contends that just as man by 
exercising his will in law has a legal personality so too does the state.39 On this point he 
states: 
Our German jurisprudence was the first to abandon the theory of Roman 
Law, which regarded the conception of personality as bound up with the 
Treitschke, Politics, 8. For Treitschke the essence of "political genius" is one that is "national." Ibid. 
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individual, and it defined legal personality by competence to act in law. In 
this way the dictum becomes applicable to the State as well, for the State 
is the people's collective will.40 
Thus, Treitschke contends that states' legal personalities, in "the juridical" and "politico-
moral sense," allows one to speak "of their individuality."41 He writes, "Even as certain 
people have certain traits, which they cannot alter however much they try, so also the 
State has characteristics, which cannot be obliterated."42 Thus, "the State, then has for all 
time been a legal person" in the "historico-moral sense."4 
With respect to Treitschke's second condition, that the state's individuality is 
defined through its ability to wage war, he states, "It is the right of arms, which 
distinguishes the state from all other forms of corporate life." 4 Treitschke places an 
immense importance upon the state's ability to engage in the international arena. His 
view in rooted in his perception of history as a great drama, in which humankind is in a 
state of perpetual conflict over resources and material wealth. In this rendering, the state 
is the vehicle through which society expresses itself as a collective unit, and is thus the 
main actor within this drama of history.45 As such, states, Treitschke writes, "must be 
conceived as the great collective personalities of history."46 For Treitschke the state's 
ability to protect and defend its territory represents one of its most fundamental criteria. 
We have described the State as an independent force. This pregnant 
theory of independence implies firstly so absolute a moral supremacy that 
the State cannot legitimately tolerate any power above its own, and 
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secondly a temporal freedom entailing a variety of material resources 
adequate to its protection against hostile influences. Legal sovereignty, 
the States complete independence of any other earthly power, is so rooted 
in its nature that it may be said to be its very standard and criterion.47 
According to Treitschke, the state attains to self-realization through intercourse with 
those who challenge it. Thus, Treitschke views war as an essential function of the state, 
which is apparent in three ways. First, it is the means through which states become 
formally recognized in the international arena. Secondly, the state's ability to fight and 
defend itself represents one of its primary functions. Third, Treitschke argues that war is 
a permanent feature of civilized life and is the primary means through which a state 
exercises its inherent will. "Without war", Treitschke contends, "no State could be. All 
those we know of arose through war, and the protection of their members by armed force 
remains their primary and essential task."48 War, in Treitschke's view, is a natural act, 
and as such, he glorifies conflict between states as both a necessary and positive feature 
of history. He states, "War therefore will endure to the end of history, as long as there is 
a multiplicity of States. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any 
alternative, neither is one to be wished for."49 Man's inherent nature as reflected in the 
form of the state and its competition with other states renders war, in Treitschke's view, 
as "a necessary and beneficial activity of the State."50 "In this eternal conflict of separate 
States," Treitschke writes, "lies the beauty of History; the wish to do away with this 
rivalry is simply unintelligent."51 
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Treitschke's glorification of war is ultimately an expression of the two principles 
that guide his conception of the state. The first, as has already been discussed, is his 
conception of the state as an individual. For Treitschke, a state's interaction with other 
states in the international arena serves as the context that is most demonstrative of their 
individuality. On this point he states: 
In State treaties it is the will of the State, which is expressed, not the 
personal desires of the individuals who conclude them, and the treaty is 
binding as long as the contracting State exists. When a State is incapable 
of enforcing its will, or of maintaining law and order at home and prestige 
abroad, it becomes an anomaly and falls prey either to anarchy or a foreign 
enemy.52 
Secondly, along with the administration of justice, conflict serves as the exercise 
through which the state expresses its will. For Treitschke the state's ability to express its 
will is what defines it and underlies its essence. Indeed, as Kohn states, in Treitschke's 
conception of the state, "will is the essence of the State-not ethics, reason, or usefulness, 
but will independent of these criteria."53 As such Treitschke comes to identify the state 
as a manifestation of power, as the state relies on its power to express its will. Thus, he 
proposes a new definition of the state, stating, 
If we examine our definition of the State as "the people legally united as 
an independent entity," we find that it can be more briefly put thus: "The 
State is the public force for Offence and Defense." It is above all, Power, 
which makes its will to prevail.54 
Thus, for Treitschke, the state exercises its power through its roles as a moralizing 
agency, a legal authority and its ability to wage war. "The State is power", Treitschke 
Treitschke, Politics, 11. 
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claims, "precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers. 
War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks of even the most barbaric 
States."55 These tasks Treitschke contends are only "conceivable where a plurality of 
States are found existing side by side," hence his belief in the necessity of conflict 
amongst states and his glorification of war within history.56 
Thus, for Treitschke the state's "function is merely protective and 
administrative. Its purpose is to "surround the whole, regulating and protecting it." 
The state, Treitschke argues, 
can only work by an external compulsion; it only represents the people 
from the point of view of power. Even this implies a great deal. For in 
the State is not only the arena for the great primitive forces of human 
nature; it is also the basis of all national life. In short, a people, which is 
not in a position to create and maintain under the wing of the State an 
external organization of its own intellectual existence deserves to perish.59 
Thus, Treitschke characterizes the state as "universally and genuinely just" as it 
represents the sole power within society that administers justice and protects its people 
and territory.60 As Dorpalen writes, Treitschke conceives of the state, as 
the indispensable iron framework within which the anarchical and 
conflicting aspirations of a selfish society must be kept under control. The 
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state is viewed primarily as an instrument of protection and order, and it 
fulfills these functions with the help of its power resources. 
Indeed, for Treitschke the benefit of a state based on power was that it could control the 
various conflicting interests within society thus eliminating the need for 
parliamentarianism or the expansion of suffrage, both of which he abhorred. For 
Treitschke the state's ability to function as such rendered it sacred. On this point he 
states, 
Law and peace and order cannot spring from the manifold and eternally 
clashing interests of society, but from the power, which stands above it, 
armed with the strength to restrain its wild passions. It is here that we get 
a clear idea of what we may speak of as the moral sanctity of the State. 
The State it is which brings justice and mercy into this struggling world.63 
Thus, Treitschke's disdain for democracy and his conception of the state as power 
culminated in his contention that the relationship between the state and its population is 
not dictated by the consent of the governed. Rather, the state, Treitschke argues, as the 
"highest external community of men" requires the complete submission of its members.' 
Treitschke's argument is that for the state's "will to prevail" its citizens are 
required to submit themselves to the will of the state. "Submission," Treitschke 
contends, "is what the State primarily requires; it insists upon acquiescence; its very 
essence is the accomplishment of its will."65 Essentially, Treitschke's demand for the 
submission of society to the will of the State is to ensure the continuance of the state's 
primary functions. Treitschke contends that the state's primary functions cannot work 
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unless the society, which they regulate, obeys the state's will. Any failure to obey the 
state would result in the gradual dissolution of society into a state of anarchy. 
Consequently, Treitschke's discussion within Politics on the individual's acquiescence to 
the state takes the form of a demand rather than a plea. He states, 
The nation is not entirely comprised in the state, but the State protects and 
embraces the people's life, regulating its external aspects on every side. It 
does not ask primarily for opinion, but demands obedience, and its laws 
must be obeyed, whether willingly or no.66 
Thus, for Treitschke, one's obedience to the will of the state can be either voluntary or 
compulsory. Either form of submission is acceptable. Ultimately the state requires 
obedience in any form in order to ensure that the sources of its power are preserved. For 
Treitschke, Davis states, "spontaneous obedience, based upon reasoned approval of the 
law is what the State most desires." Yet, "the State can exist when the obedience which 
it receives is merely rendered under compulsion."67 
The significance of Treitschke's demand for one's submission to the state is that it 
renders the state's interests as above those of the individual. The state's will contradicts 
and overrides the will of the individual. Thus, reduced to its core, Treitschke's argument 
is that the relationship between the individual and the state will always be determined by 
the superiority of the state. The sheer strength of the state's character, as the legal, 
military and moral power within society, renders it superior to the individual. As a result 
of having argued that the state is superior to the individual, Treitschke rejects the 
democratic view of the state as simply a means for its citizens to reach a desired end. 
Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, 131. 
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To regard the State as nothing but a means for the citizen's end is to place 
the subjective aspect too high. The greatness of the State lies precisely in 
its power of uniting the past with the present and the future: and 
consequently no individual has the right to regard the State as the servant 
of his own aims but is bound by moral duty and physical necessity to 
subordinate himself to it, while the State lies under the obligation to 
concern itself with the life of its citizens by extending to them its help and 
protection.68 
As to how far the state's will extends its influence over the life of its citizens, 
Treitschke contends that the lessons of history demonstrate that the state's independent 
will achieves only the amount of power it needs to ensure its rule. "Historical 
experience," states Treitschke, "examined fairly and without prejudice teaches us that the 
State can overshadow practically the whole of a people's life. It will dominate it to the 
precise extent in which it is in a position to do so."69 Thus, in Treitschke's view, 
theoretically no limit can be set to the functions of a state.70 Rather, the minimum tasks a 
state must perform are those already discussed above, namely its military functions and 
its legal system. 
While most of Politics discusses the role and function of the state, Treitschke does 
make some points relating to nationalism in general. Treitschke states that he uses the 
term "nation" in "the political sense" as "the meaning attached to it in ordinary speech" is 
"extremely capricious."71 Thus, he favors the use of the term "nationality" in order to 
"convey the idea of a common blood."72 
Treitschke divides the notion of nationality from statehood and recognizes the 
tensions between the two. While he acknowledges nationalities desire to create states of 
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their own, he stays true to his earlier positions and continues to assert that the interests of 
the state are above those of the nation or nationality. His belief that "states do not arise 
out of the people's sovereignty, but they are created against the will of the people" 
reveals his conception of the "nation as a subordinate creation of central, political 
authority." He justifies this position by arguing that the concept of nationality is not a 
"settled or permanent thing" and as such a state "must have the right to merge into one of 
the nationalities contained within itself."74 Yet, Treitschke did recognize the importance 
of nationality, in the sense of one's awareness of one's national identity and the devotion 
to the state one feels because of it. Thus, Treitschke both embraced nationality as a 
unifying agent within the state and rejected nationality as a principle, which sought to 
deliver a sovereign nation to all people who perceived themselves to be a nationality. His 
argument is as follows. 
Treitschke regarded the rise of "the principle of nationality," as a product of "the 
natural revulsion against the world-empire of Napoleon."75 Treitschke rejected those 
varieties of nationalism, which assumed the right to create sovereign nations, as they 
were, in his view, a challenge to the primacy of the state.76 He wrote, "The unhappy 
attempt to transform the multiplicity of European life into the arid uniformity of universal 
sovereignty has produced the exclusive sway of nationality as the dominant political idea. 
Cosmopolitanism has receded too far."77 Treitschke argued that despite the rise of 
"national antagonisms" in the nineteenth century and the subsequent "talk of setting up a 
73 
Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory, 23. 
74
 Treitschke, Politics, 124, 129. 
75 
Treitschke, "Politics," in Guibernau, Nationalisms, 12. 
It should be noted that Treitschke's rejection of nationalism was not a rejection of pride in one's people 
or nation-state, which Treitschke referred to as patriotism. Rather, it was the growth of the national 




principle of nationality" one must "keep our vision clear from the confusions of 
Napoleonic phraseology."78 Thus, Treitschke called upon his listeners to refrain from 
accepting the national principle as a given reality and instead to look at the relationship 
between nationalities and the state as they functioned throughout history. By doing so, he 
states, one can identify, 
two strong forces working in history; firstly, the tendency of every State to 
amalgamate its population, in speech and manners, into one single mould, 
and secondly, the impulse of every vigorous nationality to construct a 
State of its own. It is obvious that we have here two divergent forces, 
which generally oppose and struggle against each other.79 
Thus, Treitschke seeks "to discover what settlement" could reconcile these two 
forces. His answer is that the "natural tendency is that the conceptions 'Nation' and 
'State' should coincide with one another" as this is "the instinct of all great nations."80 
Yet, Treitschke recognized that, while a state should ideally be based on nationality (i.e. a 
state should control a coherent and unitary nation), history has shown this is not 
inevitable. For instance, Treitschke cites the difference between Western Europe and the 
East, as an example of how states that are composed of a uniform nationality (ethnic 
makeup) are stronger as a result of being so. The West, he states, is composed of "larger 
and more compact ethnological masses" while the East is "the classic soil for the 
fragments of nations."81 As a result of its fragmentary character, the East, Treitschke 
contends, bears great difficulty in attaining a sense of "inward unity."82 Thus, Treitschke 










concludes, "the unity of the State should be based on nationality" as this represents "the 
normal condition."83 
Yet, Treitschke recognizes that nationality "is no permanent thing" by which he 
means that nationalities throughout history have been forcefully integrated into one 
another thus making it quite impossible to speak of a "purely national history," meaning 
that nations have not developed as ethnically uniform.84 Rather, Treitschke views history 
as having unfolded as a "great process of attrition" in which nations or nationalities have 
been forcefully integrated into one another.85 He states, 
It is impossible to expound the facts of history genealogically as if it were 
a family tree. We must rather say that even nationalities are subject to the 
currents of historical life, and it is equally instructive and difficult for the 
historian to trace out these ethnographical fluctuations.86 
Thus, nationality, Treitschke states, "forms part of the current of history." As such 
nationalities are flexible and are vulnerable to the whims of historical progress. 
"Almighty God," Treitschke writes, 
did not separate the nations into glass cases as if they were botanical 
specimens, and we can see for ourselves how history has molded them all. 
Nationality is no permanent thing; there are great nations whose original 
character and native genius have never quite been lost, but we can trace 
how it has mingled with other streams.8 
Thus, despite the intermixing of nationalities through various historical processes, such as 
the conquering of one nation by another, Treitschke maintains that the strength of a 
specific nationality's character is not necessarily diluted via the enforced mixture of 
nations. Rather, he argues that "the power of the will" of those nations that formed their 
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own states is strengthened through these historical processes. He states, "In the powerful 
mill through which a nation is ground when it mingles with another, the softer sides of 
the character are easily destroyed, but the power of the will is fortified."88 Indeed, 
Treitschke contends that within states, which harbor multiple nations, the nation that 
wields authority-that being the nation that successfully formed the state-is, compared to 
SO 
the nations over which it stands, "superior in civilization." 
Therefore, according to Treitschke the concept of nationality, as it pertains to the 
"the principle of nationality" is not clearly discernable when viewed through the lens of 
historical study. Nations and the nationalities that comprise them are molded by history: 
thus they can and have changed over time. This does not mean that Treitschke dismissed 
the importance of the concept of the nation and nationalities as they relate to the state. As 
stated previously, he believed that ideally a state should be based upon a nationality. 
Rather, Treitschke's argument is that the principle of nationality is founded upon a 
perception which fails to concur with what he argued was historical reality. Treitschke 
takes this argument even further by referring to the 'imaginary nature' of the blood ties 
that were often presumed to link the nation. 
In what can only be considered as a rather surprising statement for a figure 
notorious for his racist vitriol and as a leading proponent of an ethnic style of German 
nationalism, Treitschke wrote, "The legal bond [within the State] must at the same time 
be felt to be a natural one, arising automatically out of a blood-relationship either real or 
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imaginary (for on this point nations labour under the most extraordinary delusions)." 
That a nation's sense of its nationality "could be either real or imagined" mattered to 
Treitschke only as it related to justifying the claims of those who promoted the national 
principle and in doing so challenged the state's authority. Treitschke's argument is that 
the imaginary nature of nationality renders it invalid as a principle. Therefore, in the 
ongoing battle between a state's desire to amalgamate its population into a single entity 
and "the impulse of every vigorous nationality to create a State of its own," the desired 
outcome is that the state should exist as the power over the nationalities, which comprise 
it.91 Consequently he concluded, "that there is nothing to be gained from barren talk 
about the right of nationality."92 Rather, for Treitschke, the importance of nationality was 
that it represented a perception of an ethnically homogenous society that helped to 
underpin the "legal bond" between the state and its citizens. That this nationality, in 
certain instances, was based on either a "real or imaginary" blood relationship mattered 
less to Trietschke as long as it could be used to strengthen the state's power, thereby 
ensuring its will to power. Furthermore, despite its imaginary character, Treitschke views 
nationality as instrumental in its ability to ferment a society's sense of national identity, 
which he refers to as patriotism. For Treitschke, the importance of patriotism was that it 
helps to facilitate the natural quality of the "legal bond" or 'unity,' between citizens. 
Treitschke defines "genuine patriotism" as "the consciousness of co-operating 





to descendents."93 By this Treitschke means that individuals should "be aware o f or 
"know" that they are members of a given community. Individuals should be aware that 
they are not simply living in a particular state but should be conscious of belonging to a 
particular group.94 The implication here (though Treitschke does not use the term 
'nationality') is that the individual should be aware of his (or her) nationality or national 
identity and that this awareness constitutes, what Treitschke argues, is patriotism. This 
sense of identity is formulated through one's awareness of a common past. 
Furthermore, Treitschke's definition of patriotism requires active participation on the part 
of the individual. 
The individual, Treitschke argues, should be active in two ways. First, the 
individual must be aware of "co-operating with the body-politic" meaning that the 
individual should perceive of himself (or herself) as not only a member of a community 
but as involved in a process.95 This point can be understood by recalling Treitschke's 
demand for the individual's submission to the state. In this context, Treitschke's view of 
patriotism is as one's awareness of his submission to the state, and his subsequent 
observance of the state's authority as a legal and moral power. Second, the individual is 
patriotic by being aware of his "ancestral achievements" or common past and by 
instilling this sense of identity in his descendents. The result of one's patriotism is that it 
creates a quasi-religious bond between the individual and the state, which Treitschke 
refers to as "national honour."96 The product of this dynamic, Treitschke states, is that 
"the high moral ideal of national honour is a factor handed down from one generation to 
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another, enshrining something positively sacred, and compelling the individual to 
sacrifice himself to it. This ideal is above all price and cannot be reduced to pounds, 
shilling and pence."97 Thus, for Treitschke "national honour" represents the highest form 
of patriotism. This is especially so as it ensures that the individual will "sacrifice" 
himself, in its name, thus submitting to the will of the state. Furthermore, this sense of 
national honor is transmitted from generation to generation ensuring that the state will 
continue to exist as superior to the individual, which in Treitschke's view is necessary in 
order for the state's "will to prevail."98 Thus, Treitschke's view of the state's relationship 
to the individual and the individual's sense of his national identity are both determined by 
the needs of the state. 
Thus, Treitschke's conception of the state and its relationship to the people or 
nation, is guided by the state's needs to preserve and express its power, which was based 
upon its primary functions as a legal and military authority. In order to achieve this end, 
the state requires the submission of the individual. This submission was partially 
predicated on what today would be referred to as a national consciousness. In many 
respects Tretischke's conception of the state is based upon his perception of liberty or 
freedom, which he saw as contingent upon the needs of the state. On this point he said, 
"One always returns to the same premise that personal liberty cannot be an absolute right, 
but is limited by the living necessity of the state itself."99 As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, Treitschke's belief that the state's interests are superior to those of the 
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individual functions as his guiding rationale in the period of the Franco-Prussian war and 
is reflective of a more general German historiographical discourse. 
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Chapter Two: Ernest Renan and the nation-state 
"What is a nation?" was a lecture delivered by Renan on 11 March 1882, at the 
Sorbonne conference of the Association Scientifique de France. For Renan, the speech 
was personally significant as he saw it as the culmination of his views on the structure of 
the nation and nationality in the modern world. In the preface to Discours et conferences 
(1887), a collection in which the speech was later included, Renan referred to it as the 
. . . part of this volume to which I attach the most importance.... I have 
weighed every word with the greatest care. It is my profession of faith in 
what concerns human things, and, when modern civilization has become 
engulfed in the wake of these disastrous words: Nation, nationality, race, I 
hope that someone will remember these twenty pages. I believe them to 
be completely correct.1 
From the outset of his speech, Renan informs his listeners that his intention is to 
"analyze" the concept of the nation, "an idea" which, he states, "though seemingly clear 
lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings."2 The problem, as Renan saw it, 
was that "Nowadays, a far graver mistake is made: race is confused with nation and a 
sovereignty analogous to that of really existing peoples is attributed to ethnographic or, 
rather linguistic groups."3 Renan stated that his intention was to clarify these errors by 
performing upon the concept of the nation something "akin to a vivisection" in which he 
would analyze the nation "with an absolutely cool and impartial attitude."4 
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In Renan's view, since the disintegration of Charlemagne's empire, Western 
Europe has settled into "a kind of equilibrium" as a result of the creation of the modern 
nation-state. Western Europe, he states, has progressed into a geo-political reality in 
which nations such as France, England, Germany and Russia, "will for centuries to come, 
no matter what may befall them, continue to be individual historical units, the crucial 
pieces on a chequerboard whose squares will forever vary in importance and size but will 
never be wholly confused with each other."6 
This situation, Renan contends, is unique throughout historical experience. 
Nations, of this character, Renan argues, did not exist in antiquity. "Classical antiquity" 
Renan states, "had its republics and municipal kingdoms, confederations of local 
republics and empires, yet, it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding 
of the term."7 Therefore, Renan reasons that, "nations, in this sense of the term are 
something fairly new in history."8 More specifically, Renan traces the emergence of 
European nations to the Germanic invasions, beginning in the fifth century and ending 
with the final Norman conquests in the tenth century, which, he argues, "introduced into 
the world the principle which, later, was to serve as the basis for the existence of 
nationalities."9 
According to Renan, the Germanic invasions set the framework for the future 
nations of Europe by imposing their "dynasties, and a military aristocracy upon the more 
or less extensive parts of the old empire of the west, which assumed the names of their 
5










invaders." Yet, Renan points out that the Germanic invaders "effected little change in 
the racial stock" of the newly dominated Western Europe.11 For Renan, the importance 
of the Germanic invasions was that they established the political and geographical 
framework from which the modern nation-state took form. Renan argues that the Treaty 
of Verdun and the subsequent partition of Western Europe "outlined divisions" which 
were "in principle immutable," thus setting the course for the forward march of the 
Western European nation-state.12 "From then on", states Renan, "France, Germany, 
England, Italy and Spain made their way, by often circuitous path and through a thousand 
and one vicissitudes, to their full national existence, such as we see it blossoming 
today."13 
Thus, for Renan, the Germanic invasions initiated the varied processes by which 
the modern nation-states of Western Europe came into existence. These states, Renan 
contends, are defined by "the fusion of their component populations," which he argues 
was specific to the nature of the interaction between the conquering Germanic tribes and 
the native populations they ruled over. To demonstrate his point Renan contrasts the 
homogeneous character of the Western European states with the fragmented modern 
"Turkish state," by which he means the Ottoman Empire. The question Renan poses is 
why the component populations of the Western European nations are united along 
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national lines whereas the Ottoman state is comprised of "Turks, Slavs, Greeks, 
Armenians, Arabs, Syrians, and Kurds" who are "as distinct today as they were upon the 
day that they were conquered?"14 His answer is that the unity of the Western European 
states, and the disunity of the modern Ottoman state can be explained as a result of two 
"crucial circumstances," the first of which was part of the historical development of 
Western European nations but absent from the development of the Ottoman Empire. 
First, Renan cites the fact that the "Germanic peoples adopted Christianity as soon as 
they underwent any prolonged contact with the Greek or Latin peoples."15 According to 
Renan, the fact that many of the conquering Germans were of the same religion or 
adopted the same religion as those they conquered meant that unlike the "Turkish 
system" there could be no religious distinction amongst the population. Second, Renan 
contends that the homogenous character of the Western European states was a result of 
the conquerors having forgotten their own language.16 Renan contends that this linguistic 
"forgetting," was the result of the intermarriage between the conquerors and the native 
population. "The crucial result" of these two circumstances, Renan states, "was that, in 
spite of the extreme violence of the customs of the German invaders, the mould which 
they imposed became, with the passing centuries, the actual mould of the nation."17 
"After one or two generations," Renan states, 
the Norman invaders no longer distinguished themselves from the rest of 
the population, although their influence was not any less profound because 
of this fact; they had given the conquered country a nobility, military 
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For Renan, the effect of this newfound identity upon his native France was that the 
population began to see all inhabitants of France as French, thus formulating a French 
national identity.19 The reality of the ethnic diversity of France's component population 
faded into the historical background and was replaced by a belief that the divisions within 
French society were the result of differences "in courage, customs and educations, all of 
which were transmitted hereditarily."20 Renan's point was that in the French society of 
his day "it did not occur to anyone that the origin of all this" -by which he means the 
creation of the French nation-"was a conquest."21 Therefore, Renan concludes that the 
process of forgetting one's history is essential in the manufacturing of national identity. 
"The essence of the nation," Renan states, "is that all individuals have many things in 
common, and also that they have forgotten many things."22 More specifically, Renan 
states that, 
Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial 
factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical 
studies often constitutes a danger for the [the principle of] nationality. 
Historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the 
origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences have 
been altogether beneficial.23 
For Renan, a nation's history and its more often than not violent origins pose a challenge 
to a nation's view of itself as an ethnically homogenous group of people, who have 
always existed as such. The historical reality, Renan argues, is that a nation's unity is 
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"always effected by means of brutality."24 Therefore, in Renan's view, a people's 
collective national identity is contingent upon their ability to collectively forget the 
"means of brutality" by which their nation came to exist. In the example of France, 
Renan states, "No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, 
or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint 
Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century." 26 
Renan specifically argues this point in order to discredit the idea of those who equate 
nationality with ethnicity. 
Addressing his fellow countrymen, Renan states that it would be impossible to 
assert that the French nationality is defined by a uniquely French ethnicity. "There are 
not ten families in France," contends Renan, "that can supply proof of their Frankish 
origin, and any such proof would anyways be essentially flawed, as a consequence of 
countless unknown alliances, which are liable to disrupt any genealogical system."27 
Thus, for Renan, the varied processes by which the nations of Western Europe came into 
existence make it impossible to consider one's national identity as representative of any 
kind of ethnically homogenous lineage. The key source of national identity is in a 
people's ability to collectively forget the violent origins, by which their nations came to 
exist. Renan contends that this collective forgetting has been a crucial component to the 
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by which the populations of these nations have come to consider themselves as a unified 
nationality. 
Renan's central point is that the modern nation is largely a product of historical 
circumstances and to an extent contingent upon them. "The modern nation," Renan 
states, "is a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts." According to 
Renan what the Germanic invaders brought to Western Europe was kingship, military 
aristocracies and bounded (and named) territories, not race or language or culture. As 
Smith, in describing Renan's thesis, states, 
While their conversion to Christianity and much linguistic forgetting 
helped to fuse populations, the dynastic territories re-divided them along 
political-that is, national-lines. Here we see the primary thrust of Renan's 
thesis . . . It is a vindication of the political definition of the nation and, 
secondarily, though in more muted vein, of the historic power of German 
monarchical government.29 
For Renan, the means by which nations became unified, though sometimes different, 
were historical in character meaning they can be traced to specific historical causes or 
events each with their own underlying principles. On this point, he states, 
Sometimes unity has been effected by a dynasty, as was the case in 
France; sometimes it has been brought about by the direct will of the 
provinces, as was the case with Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium; 
sometimes it has been the work of a general consciousness, belatedly 
victorious over the caprices of feudalism, as was the case in Italy and 
Germany. These formations always had a profound raison d'etre}0 
Yet, Renan recognizes that to solely claim that nations are modern and the product of 
historical processes does not answer the fundamental questions of what it is that 
constitutes a nation or the concept of nationality. Consequently, Renan asks, 
Renan, "What is a nation?," 11-12. 
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But what is a nation? Why is Holland a nation, when Hanover, or the 
Grand Duchy of Parma, are not? How is it that France continues to be a 
nation, when the principle which created it has disappeared? How is it 
that Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or 
four races, is a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogenous, is not 
one? Why is Austria a state and not a nation? In what ways does the 
principle of nationality differ from that of races? These are points that a 
thoughtful person would wish to have settled, in order to put his mind to 
rest. The affairs of this world can hardly be said to be ruled by 
reasoning's of this sort, yet diligent men are desirous of bringing some 
reason into these matters and of unraveling the confusions in which 
superficial intelligences are entangled. 
To address these questions Renan employs an analytical approach in which he 
considers six factors commonly cited as the basis for the nation and nationality: the 
dynastic principle, race, language, religion, community of interests and geography. 
Through his analysis, Renan demonstrates that none of these assumed factors on which 
nationalities are allegedly based account for how modern European nations have been 
formed throughout history. Renan argues that for each factor, offered as a criterion to 
"objectively" define a nation, there exists a historical counterexample that refutes it, 
meaning that there are existing nations that do not match the proposed criterion. Thus, 
Renan approaches each factor as they relate to a range of 'case studies' and abandons 
each when they prove unproductive as an explanation for what it is that serves as the 
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basis for nationality. His analysis is as follows. 
Renan rejects the dynastic principle as a basis for nationality by citing the 
examples of nations, such as Switzerland and the United States, which achieved nation-
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hood, yet had "no dynastic basis." Renan admits that the majority of nations were 
"made by a family of feudal origin" which "contracted a marriage with the soil and which 
was in some sense a nucleus of centralization."35 On this point Renan is bound to 
partially agree or risk contradicting his claim that the modern nations of Western Europe 
originated with the Germanic invaders, many of whom ruled as kings. Yet, for Renan the 
examples of Switzerland and the United States render the dynastic principle as 
unacceptable as an "absolute law" or as an explanation for the basis of nations or 
nationality.36 Therefore, he states, 
It must be admitted that a nation can exist without a dynastic principle, 
and even for the nations, which have been formed by dynasties can be 
separated from them without therefore ceasing to exist. The old principle, 
which only takes account of the right of princes, could no longer be 
maintained; apart from dynastic right, there is also national right.37 
Having dispensed with the dynastic principle, Renan again turns his attention to 
those who assert that race is the basis for nationality or what Renan calls "national right." 
Renan's criticisms in this case are specifically directed towards the strain of German 
nationalism predominant at the time, which conflated national right with ethnicity, 
thereby justifying German territorial expansion. For, Renan the German case is an 
example of the more general threat ethnographic politics pose to European civilization as 
a whole. 
Several confidently assert that [nationality] is derived from race. The 
artificial divisions, resulting from feudalism, from princely marriages, 
from diplomatic congresses are [these authors assert] in a state of decay. 
It is a population's race, which remains firm and fixed. This is what 
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constitutes a right, a legitimacy. The Germanic family, according to the 
theory I am expounding here, has the right to reassemble the scattered 
limbs of the Germanic order over such-and-such a province is stronger 
than the right of the inhabitants of that province over themselves. There is 
thus created a kind of primordial right analogous to the divine right of 
kings; an ethnographic principle is substituted for a national one. This is a 
very great error, which, if it were to become dominant, would destroy 
European civilization. The primordial right of races is as narrow and as 
perilous for genuine progress as the national principle is just and 
legitimate.38 
To counter the ethnographic definition of the nation and nationality, Renan 
constructs an historical argument that seeks to convince his listeners of the fallacy of such 
a view of the nation. The history of Western Europe, Renan argues, shows that 
"ethnographic considerations have played no part in the constitution of modern 
nations." While race was a unifying factor amongst the tribes and cities of antiquity, 
Western history, Renan contends, progressed in such a way as to discredit ethnicity as a 
causal force by which societies became grouped together. 
Renan begins his discussion with the onset of the Roman Empire, which, he 
states, "dealt the gravest of blows to the idea of race" as it was "preserved through 
common interest" and ruled over a "great agglomeration of cities and provinces wholly 
different from each-other."40 The rise of Christianity that followed, with its universal and 
absolute character, aligned itself with the Roman Empire, the result of which, Renan 
states, "debarred" the "ethnographic argument from the government of human affairs for 










nothing ethnographic about them."42 The shape of their kingdoms was determined by the 
"whim of the invaders" who were indifferent to the race of their subject populations. 
Furthermore, the partition of Verdun, which, as already discussed held great importance 
for Renan as it had set the framework for the modern nation, was fashioned in such a way 
that it paid no attention to the race of the peoples it divided. Consequently, Renan 
contends, that the truth of history reveals that 
there is no pure race and that to make politics depend upon ethnographic 
analysis is to surrender to a chimera. The noblest countries, England, 
France, and Italy, are those where the blood is the most mixed. Is 
Germany an exception in this respect? Is it a purely Germanic country? 
This is a complete illusion. The whole of the south was once Gallic; the 
whole of the east, from the river Elbe on, is Slav. Even those parts which 
are claimed to be really pure, are they in fact so? We touch here on one of 
those problems in regard to which it is of the utmost importance that we 
equip ourselves with clear ideas and ward off misconceptions.43 
The problem, as Renan sees it, is that "philologically-minded historians" have 
tended to discuss race in much the same way as "physiologically-minded 
anthropologists" interpret the term, the result of which has been a conflation of race with 
nationality. Whereas anthropologists view race in zoological terms, meaning, "it serves 
to indicate real descent, a blood relation," the study of language and history, Renan states, 
"does not lead to the same divisions as does physiology.44 Renan's argument is that the 
zoological origins of humanity massively predate those of language, culture and 
civilization. Even "primitive groupings" such as the Aryans and Semites had no 
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he argues, a fact of history in that they lived in a "particular epoch." Rather, his 
contention is that by the time these groups existed "the zoological origin of humanity" 
had already been "lost in impenetrable darkness."46 Therefore, what is known 
philologically and historically as a nationality is not the same as an anthropological 
understanding of ethnicity. This is clearly so, Renan argues, when one considers the 
degree of ethnic diversity that comprises the German, English and French nationalities. 
In the case of Germany, Renan states, 
What is known philologically and historically as the Germanic race is no 
doubt a quite distinct family within the human species, but is it a family in 
the anthropological sense of the term? Certainly not. The emergence of an 
individual Germanic identity occurred only a few centuries prior to Jesus 
Christ. One may take it that the Germans did not emerge from the earth at 
this epoch. Prior to this, mingled with the Slavs in this huge indistinct 
mass of the Scythians, they did not have their own separate individuality.47 
Much the same, Renan states, could be said of the English, who are 
indeed a type within the whole of humanity. However, the type of what is 
quite improperly called the Anglo-Saxon race is neither the Briton of 
Julius Caesar's time, nor the Anglo-Saxon of Hengist's time, nor the Dane 
of Canute's time, nor the Norman of William the Conqueror's time; it is 
rather the result of all these [elements].48 
As for the French, they are, Renan states, 
Neither a Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. Rather, [they are] what 
has emerged out of the cauldron in which, presided over by the King of 
France, the most diverse elements have together been simmering. A 
native of Jersey or Guernsey differs in no way, as far as his origins are 










Thus, Renan's point is that racial explanations of nationality clearly do not stand up to the 
scrutiny of historical analysis. For Renan, the conflation of race with nationality has 
mostly occurred for political purposes, which pay no attention to the historical reality of 
the development of the modern nation-state. For Renan, historical investigation 
conducted in an objective way reveals that the perception of European civilization as 
composed of a collection of ethnically homogenous nations is clearly not reflective of the 
modern nation-state. 
Race, as we historians understand it, is something which is made and 
unmade. The study of race is of crucial importance for the scholar 
concerned with the history of humanity. It has no applications, however, 
in politics. The instinctive consciousness which presided over the 
construction of the map of Europe took no account of race, and the leading 
nations of Europe are of essentially mixed blood.50 
Throughout his discussion of race as a basis for the nation and nationality, Renan 
discussed several Western European nations, including his native France. Yet, the 
primary object of his attention was the German ethnographic style of politics and its self-
justifying rationale for the annexation of the formally French province Alsace in 1871. 
Renan's discussion on race should, thus, be viewed as a general theory on the 
incompatibility of the notions of race and nationality that sought to counter what he 
viewed as a specifically Germanic style of ethnic nationalism. This is clearly seen in the 
following passage, in which Renan warns both his listeners and the Germans themselves 
of the dangers ethnographic politics may yield. 
The fact of race, which was originally crucial, thus becomes increasingly 
less important. Human history is essentially different from zoology, and 
race is not everything, as it is among the rodents or the felines, and one 
does not have the right to go through the world fingering people's skulls, 
43 
and taking them by the throat saying: 'You are of our blood; you belong to 
us!' Aside from anthropological characteristics, there are such things as 
reason, justice, the true, and the beautiful, which are the same for all. Be 
on your guard, for this ethnographic politics is in no way a stable thing 
and today you use it against others, tomorrow you may see it turned 
against yourselves. Can you be sure that the Germans, who have raised 
the banner of ethnography so high, will not see the Slavs in their turn 
analyze the names of villages in Saxony and Lusatia, search for any traces 
of the Wiltzes or of the Obotrites, and demand recompense for the 
massacres and the wholesale enslavements that the Ottoss (sic) inflicted 
upon their ancestors? It is good for everyone to know how to forget.51 
Thus, for Renan, the danger of ethnographic politics lies in its ability to reawaken 
the dormant memories of those violent episodes that reside in all national histories. That 
the ethnic makeup of the modern European nations bears no resemblance to those of their 
ancestors makes little difference in ethnographic politics, as such a view of the nation 
does not consider the historical development of Western Europe as it truly occurred. 
Turning his attention to language, Renan argues that many of the points he made in 
relation to race can be equally applied to those who assert that language is a basis for 
nationality. 
Language, according to Renan, does function as a unifying force among 
populations but he argues that it is not a fundamental determinant of nationality. 
Language, Renan states, 
Invites people to unite, but it does not force them to do so. The United 
States and England, Latin America and Spain, speak the same languages 
yet do not form single nations. Conversely, Switzerland, so well made, 
since she was made with the consent of her differing parts, numbers three 
or four languages.52 
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For Renan, these examples serve as evidence that a shared language between peoples 
does not necessitate a drive toward nationhood. Rather, Renan contends, examples such 
as Switzerland demonstrate that it is a people's will to unify that acts as the catalyst for 
their national aspirations.53 Yet, much like his discussion on race and nationality, 
Renan's primary objection is with the way in which language is used as a source for 
ethnographic politics. On the connection between the two, Renan states, 
I was speaking just now of the disadvantages of making international 
politics depend on ethnography; they would be no less if one were to make 
it depend upon comparative philology... The political importance 
attaching to languages derives from their being regarded as signs of race. 
Nothing could be more false. Prussia, where only German is now spoken, 
spoke Slav a few centuries ago; in Wales, English is spoken; Gaul and 
Spain speak the primitive dialects of Alba Longa; Egypt speaks Arabic; 
there are countless other examples one could quote.54 
Thus, much like the belief that nationality is based upon ethnic homogeneity, 
Renan argues that a look at the linguistic history of nations reveals that, "A similarity of 
language did not presuppose similarity of race."55 Rather, languages, Renan states, "are 
historical formations, which tell us very little about the blood of those who speak them 
and which, in any case, could not shackle human liberty when it is a matter of deciding 
the family with which one unites oneself for life or for death."56 
Thus, for Renan, the dangers of viewing language or ethnicity as analogous to 
nationality are one and the same. Both, Renan argues, put forth a view of mankind, 
Ibid. "There is something in man" Renan states, "which is superior to language, namely the will." In 
the case of Switzerland, Renan states "The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the diversity of her 
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which is ultimately contrary to a view of the individual as belonging to a greater 
collective humanity that presupposes racial, linguistic and national differences. 
The exclusive concern with language, like an excessive preoccupation 
with race, has its dangers and its drawbacks. Such exaggerations enclose 
one within a specific culture, considered as national; one limits oneself, 
one hems oneself in. One leaves the heady air that one breathes in the vast 
field of humanity in order to enclose oneself in a conventicle with one's 
compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more 
disturbing for civilization. Let us not abandon the fundamental principle 
that man is a reasonable and moral being, before he is cooped up in such 
and such a language, before he is a member of such and such a race, 
before he belongs to such and such a culture. Before French, German, or 
Italian culture there is human culture.57 
While the bulk of Renan's speech dealt with the subjects of race and language and 
their relationship to nationality, he does make some points regarding religion, the 
economy and geography, and how each does not form the basis of the nation. 
With regard to religion, Renan argues that, within the settings of the modern 
nation, religion does not function as a sufficient unifying force that binds together a 
nationality. Whereas in the ancient past religion took the form of a "state religion" in 
which each citizen was obligated to pay homage to the official civic religion, much as 
one would any other common custom, in modern times, Renan states, "there are no 
longer masses that believe in a perfectly uniform manner."58 In modern nations religion, 
Renan states, "has become an individual matter; it concerns the conscience of each 
person."59 As a result, "each person believes and practices in his own fashion what he is 
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There can no longer be a state religion; one can be French, English, 
German, and be either Catholic, Protestant, or orthodox Jewish, or else 
practice no cult at a l l . . . The divisions of nations into Catholics and 
Protestants no longer exists . . .[As a result,] religion has ceased almost 
entirely to be one of the elements which serve to define the frontiers of 
peoples.61 
With regard to the question of the nation as a "community of interest", by which 
Renan means that a nation is united by material or economic considerations, Renan states 
that economic interests alone do not suffice to make a nation. While, economic interests 
may bring about trade agreements, to view this as the sole criterion for a nation would be 
to ignore the "sentimental side" of nationality.62 Once again referring to the German 
case, Renan remarks, "A Zollverein is not apatrie."63 
Regarding geography, Renan recognizes the considerable role natural frontiers 
play in the division of nations and history in general. Yet, much like his discussion on 
race and language, Renan argues, that geographical markers, such as rivers and 
mountains, which serve as the dividing lines between modern nations are contingent upon 
the whims of history. By this, Renan means that geographic locations are accorded their 
status as the dividing lines between nations by the varied processes which created these 
nations, not by their mere existence. On this point Renan poses the following question, 
Can one say, however, that as some parties believe, a nation's frontiers are 
written on the map and that this nation has the right to judge what is 
necessary to round off certain contours, in order to reach such and such a 
mountain and such and such a river, which are thereby accorded a kind of 
a priori limiting faculty? I know of no doctrine, which is more arbitrary or 





Ibid. Zollverein is the German word for customs union. Patrie is French for homeland. 
Ibid. 
47 
As to the strategic importance of geography as it concerns the frontiers of a nation, Renan 
recognizes a nation's need to protect its territory. Yet, he argues that the military 
necessity of preserving a nation's territorial integrity is not unconditional and that to view 
it as such would result in perpetual warfare. Renan states, "People talk of strategic 
grounds. Nothing, however, is absolute; it is quite clear that many concessions should be 
made to necessity. But these concessions should not be taken too far. Otherwise, 
everybody would lay claim to their military conveniences, and one would have unceasing 
war."65 Therefore, Renan concludes that geography, like race, cannot serve as the basis 
for the nation, as it fails to account for the spiritual nature that characterizes the modern 
nation-state. 
It is no more soil than it is race, which makes a nation. The soil furnishes 
the substratum, the field of struggle and of labour; man furnishes the soul. 
Man is everything in the formation of this sacred thing, which is called a 
people. Nothing [purely] material suffices for it. A nation is a spiritual 
principle, the outcome of the profound complications of history; it is a 
spiritual family not a group determined by the shape of the earth.66 
Having argued the inadequacy of the dynastic principle, race, language, religion, 
community of interest and geography as explanations for what constitutes the nation and 
nationality, Renan drew his own conclusion as to what forms the basis of the nation. "A 
nation" Renan contends, "is a soul, a spiritual principle."67 According to Renan, two 
things constitute a nation's "soul." The first is "the possession in common of a rich 




nationality, can only be provided by "history," or rather historical memories, which he 
terms "the cult of the ancestors."69 On this point, Renan states, 
The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of 
endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all the cults, that of the ancestors 
have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I 
understand genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases 
70 
a national idea. 
Furthermore, Renan argues that these historical memories must be accompanied 
by a people's clearly expressed desire to live a common life. For Renan, this "desire to 
live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in the 
71 
undivided form," represents the second component of a nation's soul. A national 
people, Renan contends, are defined by the combination of these two qualities. On this 
point he states, "To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the 
present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more-these are 
the essential conditions for being a people."72 
For Renan, this "fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, of 
having in the future, [a shared] programme to put into effect," is far more valuable than 
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"common customs posts" or "frontiers" that conform to some "strategic idea." A 
shared sense of the past in tandem with a desire to live a common life, Renan states, "are 
the kinds of things that can be understood in spite of the differences of race and 
language."74 More specifically, Renan contends that a nation's sense of shared suffering 
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is more important than any collective sense of shared joy: "Where national memories are 
concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a 
common effort."75 
All of this brings Renan to his well-known definition of a nation. He states: 
A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of 
the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is 
prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized 
however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly 
expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if 
you will pardon my metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's 
existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.76 
As already mentioned, Renan's definition has often been labeled as 'voluntarist', 
meaning that it regarded the nation as a free association of individuals each of whom 
have the right to choose their own nation. In this view Renan's definition is interpreted 
as being offered as a contrast to the organicism and determinism of the German romantic 
ideology and its articulation of the nation. Yet, as several authors point out, the 
seemingly voluntarist quality of Renan's definition has often been overstated.77 While 
Renan's view most certainly stands in contrast to the organic analogy of the nation, Smith 
persuasively argues that Renan's definition was not offered to "assert a doctrine of 
voluntary nationality or the individual's right to choose her or his nation."78 Rather, 
Renan's definition, Smith states, 
Seeks to vindicate an historical and an activist political understanding of 
the nation, one that would give due weight to the 'cult of ancestors' and to 
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a 'heroic past.' The analogy of the nation with the individual is not 
intended to support a liberal theory of individual preferences or a 
situational analysis of group identities. It is used to confirm the role of the 
past, of history and memory (and forgetting), as well as of continuing 
political will, in forging nations.79 
Indeed, Renan's emphasis on the importance of historical memory as a basis for 
nationality does not infer that a people in becoming a nationality have any choice as to 
the historical memories they acquire. Rather, these memories are determined by a 
people's historical development and thus in essence are thrust upon them regardless of 
individual preference. 
Perhaps the tendency of nationalism scholars to characterize Renan's view as 
voluntaristic is a result of Renan's choice of metaphor, that being the nation as "a daily 
plebiscite." Thus, the inference is that a people assert their nationality by choice. Yet, to 
interpret Renan's "daily plebiscite" analogy as such is to ignore the conjoining phrase 
that follows it in which Renan compares the notion of the nation as a daily plebiscite with 
the perpetual affirmation of life by the individual.80 For Renan, this comparison is meant 
the highlight the historically constructed nature of the nation. This implies that though a 
nation's roots may lie in the past, the nation, for Renan, is not merely an emanation of its 
Q 1 
past. Rather, as Palti observes, Renan's definition and more specifically his daily 
plebiscite metaphor, infer that the articulation of the nation's past, "requires a subjective 
meditation, the manifestation of a present will, which, to perpetuate itself, must be 
continually renewed" (Hence, the plebiscite metaphor in which a people regularly invoke 
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their historical memories).82 Thus, for Renan, just as individuals' wills continue to 
perpetually affirm their existence, nations whose identities are based upon a shared set of 
common historical memories will continue to affirm their common destinies, thereby 
demonstrating their desire to live a common life.83 
Interestingly, Renan, despite the spiritual character of his view of the nation, does 
not see nations as something permanent or enduring throughout history. For Renan, the 
rise of modern nations, as they constitute a framework by which societies organize 
themselves, represent a temporary state of affairs, within the greater historical 
progression of Western Europe. Nations, Renan states, "are not something eternal. They 
had their beginnings and they will end."84 Moreover, Renan posits that the division of 
Western Europe into independent nations will someday be replaced by a greater 
"European confederation."85 Yet, Renan reflects that for the nineteenth century, history 
has dictated the rise of the nation, whose existence he considers to be ultimately positive 
and necessary for European life of that period. "At the present time", Renan contends, 
"the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even. Their existence is the 
guarantee of liberty, which would be lost if the world had only one law and only one 
master." 86 
Despite their individual shortcomings, the life of nations, Renan argues, is 
representative of the means by which peoples function as part of a collective humanity. 
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contends, "through their various and often opposed powers . . . participate in the common 
work of civilization; each sounds a note in the great concert of humanity, which after all, 
is the highest ideal reality that we are capable of attaining."87 Indeed, the principal 
message Renan offers his listeners is to believe in a global humanity in which nations are 
but constituent parts. If viewed in this light, Renan contends, the weaknesses of 
individual nations become less important than the collective whole, which they comprise. 
Isolated, each [nation] has its weak point. I often tell myself that an 
individual who had those faults, which in nations are taken for good 
qualities, who fed off vainglory, who was to that degree jealous, 
egotistical, and quarrelsome, and who would draw his sword on the 
smallest pretext, would be the most intolerable of men. Yet, all of these 
QO 
discordant details disappear in the overall context. 
For Renan, this "overall context" of a world united under the umbrella of humanity, must 
function as the dominant perspective through which international relations are 
considered. Renan dedicates the closing remarks of his speech to this very subject and 
laments what he argues are the anti-empirical politics in vogue in late nineteenth century 
European political life. In response he calls upon the nations of Western Europe to return 
to the basic tenets of Enlightenment thought and its belief in a collective humanity guided 
by reason. 
In Renan's view European international relations had become dominated by what 
he terms the "transcendants of politics."89 Renan's use of the term seems to refer to those 
who, he argues, practise a style of international relations, which disregards empirical 








"transcendants" were the primary object of Renan's enmity as it is they who, Renan 
argues, base their political decisions according to a faulty view of the nation and 
nationality. The result, Renan contends, is that nations involved in territorial disputes 
have tended to dismiss the wishes of the inhabitants of the given territory under dispute, 
thereby ignoring the objective reality of the situation. Moreover, Renan outlines one 
final criterion for nationhood, that being that a nation creates a "moral conscience" and 
that it proves its right to exist through the sacrifices of its citizens in the name of this 
moral conscience. 
Let me sum up, Gentlemen. Man is a slave neither of his race nor his 
language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the 
direction taken by mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in 
mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of moral conscience, which we 
call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives us proof of its 
strength by the sacrifices, which demand the abdication of the individual 
to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to 
exist. If doubts arise regarding its frontiers, consult the populations in the 
areas under dispute. They undoubtedly have the right to a say in the 
matter. This recommendation will bring a smile to the lips of the 
transcendants of politics, these infallible beings who spend their lives 
deceiving themselves and who, from the height of their superior 
principles, take pity upon our mundane concerns. 'Consult the 
populations, for heaven's sake! How naive! A fine example of those 
wretched French ideas which claim to replace diplomacy and war by 
childishly simple methods.'90 
While it is safe to assume that Renan's references to disputed territories is based on the 
contentious issue of Alsace-Lorraine, his message is not solely limited to this one 
example. Rather, as in the rest of "What is a nation?" Renan's intention is to challenge a 
viewpoint that relates to the nation in general. Thus, for Renan, the problems that plague 
international relations all rest on philosophy, which he argues, refuses to recognize the 
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historical reality of what it is that constitutes a nation. By doing so, those who adhere to 
either a racial, linguistic or territorial view of the nation and nationality will continue to 
base their political decisions upon their distorted perception. Renan advises his listeners 
that the best way to deal with this style of politics is to be patient and wait for the reign of 
the political transcendants to come to an end, as their rule only represents a temporary 
state of affairs. Renan predicts that in its wake, people will revert back to more "modest 
empirical solutions" to international disputes. 
Wait a while, Gentlemen; let the reign of the transcendants pass: bear the 
scorn of the powerful with patience. It may be that, after many fruitless 
gropings, people will revert to our modest empirical solutions. The best 
way of being right in the future is, in certain periods to know how to 
resign oneself to being out of fashion.91 
Ibid, 20-21. 
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Chapter Three: Treitschke, the Franco-Prussian war and Alsace-Lorraine 
The pretext for the Franco-Prussian war concerned the candidacy of a relatively 
minor Prussian Prince, Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, for the Spanish throne 
following Isabella IPs deposition in 1868. France, fearing an increase in Prussian 
influence, was strongly opposed to Leopold's candidacy and protested against it. In 
response to France's objections the Prussian King William I agreed to withdraw the 
Prussian proposal. Williams's concession in this case represented a diplomatic coup for 
the French, in particular for the recently appointed French foreign minister, the Due de 
Gramont. So humiliated was Otto von Bismarck, then the Prussian Prime Minister and 
later Chancellor of the German Empire, that he considered tendering his resignation.1 
Yet, despite his initial success Gramont threw away his good fortune by sending his 
representative back to the Prussian King with a request that William would not renew 
Leopold's candidature. The King politely but firmly refused Gramont's request and then 
sent a telegram of the conversation to Bismarck. Bismarck after abbreviating the 
wording of the exchange in such a way as to make the King's language much curter and 
the rebuff to the French much sharper than they had in actuality been, sent the exchange, 
now infamously referred to as the Ems dispatch, to the press.2 Following its publication 
throughout both Germany and France, the appearance of the German leadership's 
insolence towards their French counterparts outraged both the people and government of 
France, thus creating an atmosphere between the two countries "in which reason and 
Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 26. 
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compromise were impossible."3 Following the failure of diplomatic negotiations, France, 
led by Napoleon III, declared war on Prussia and some of the southern states of Germany 
on 14 July 1870. 
The war itself was fierce but short-lived. Throughout the conflict the German 
forces consistently bested their French counterparts by the speed with which they 
mobilized, their superior strategy and their formidable artillery. On 1 September 1870 
the Battle of Sedan ended in the surrender of Napoleon along with 83,000 French 
soldiers, thus bringing an end to France's Second Empire. Despite the stunning defeat 
the war continued. On 4 September 1870 the Third Republic was proclaimed which was 
shortly followed by the siege of Paris, which began in November 1870 and continued into 
January 1871. 
On 18 January 1871, even before the French defeat had been formalized, King 
William, in an elaborate ceremony in the Galerie des Glaces in Versailles, was hailed as 
ruler of a united German Reich. Ten days later the French, now led by Adolphe Thiers 
as acting President of the Republic, accepted the terms of their defeat as embodied in the 
Treaty of Frankfurt. The treaty cost France the entire province of Alsace, a third of the 
province of Lorraine, including the cities of Strasbourg and Metz, and an indemnity of 
five million Francs.4 
As it exists today, Alsace-Lorraine at the time of the Franco-Prussian war was 
composed of two parts: The Alsatian section, located in the Rhine valley to the west of 
the Rhine river and east of the Vosges mountains, and the Lorraine section, which lay in 
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region were based on Germanic elements evident in the Alsatian language and culture, 
which dated back to German possession of the region during the Holy Roman Empire, 
although Alsace was separated from the Germanies before the Empire dissolved in 1806. 
The French acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine dated back to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in which the region was acquired in parcels by French kings, who 
claimed that the territories were rightfully French since the Rhine had been the northern 
and eastern boundary of Gaul under Roman rule. With the end of the Thirty Years' War 
in 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia placed the region within French domain though 
German princes in the region remained in possession of their landholdings. 
As a result of its French and German heritage Alsace-Lorraine developed into a 
bilingual community. While most of its educated classes spoke both French and German, 
the great majority of Alsatians spoke a Germanic dialect. In some areas of the region, 
such as parts of the Vosges valley, French was the mother tongue of a considerable 
proportion of the inhabitants and thus, was the predominant language.5 As a result of 
having been formally acquired by the French in the late seventeenth century most of the 
region's inhabitants had, by the late nineteenth century, developed a sense of belonging 
to France, as they had participated in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.6 
Yet, they had also retained aspects of their German heritage and as such developed a 
sense of their own identity distinct from their French and German rulers. As Coleman 
Phillipson, observes, native Alsatians and Lorrainers are "neither French nor German in 
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character, temperament, and ideals: they are Alsatians, sharing certain characteristics of 
the rival nations and differing markedly in other qualities."7 
The effect of the war upon French conscience was immense. Indeed, as Robert 
Gildea states, "The defeat of 1870 probably inflicted more pain on the French nation than 
any other defeat in its history, even that of 1940."8 For Germany, the Franco-Prussian 
war ushered it into nationhood. For many Germans the war and Germany's subsequent 
unification were representative of Germany's destiny to become a unified state. 
Historically, German claims to Alsace-Lorraine had been based on a variety of grounds 
ranging from historical considerations and previous ownership, nationality, race and 
language, to political necessity, security, and the right of conquest.9 Treitschke, in the 
grandiose style that characterizes much of his writing, cites all of these factors in his 
arguments concerning Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Yet, any attempt to 
properly understand Treitschke's arguments concerning Alsace-Lorraine must first 
consider his view on the Franco-Prussian war and its importance to what he argued was 
Germany's destiny. 
For Treitschke the war with France was the final act in the long historical process 
of Germany fulfilling its destiny in becoming a unified state. The war, in Treitschke's 
view, "was exactly what we Germans needed" to achieve this end.10 Thus, Treitschke 
welcomed the outbreak of war with France as this, he argued, was the necessary catalyst 
for what he correctly perceived was to be the eventual unification of the German empire. 
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These events, Treitschke argued, were representative of the divine forces by which the 
meaning of history revealed itself. 
There are great times in which those creative forces of history at which the 
thinker otherwise barely dares to guess force themselves even upon the 
most unimaginative mind as a tangible reality... Who is so blind that he 
cannot see in the miraculous events of recent days that divine spirit which 
forces us Germans to become one nation? In just this way, so crudely and 
so brazenly, the blow had to be struck against Germany's honor that our 
moral judgment could not for a moment waver, and just had to strike it if 
our disunited nation was to be aroused to the realization of its unity.11 
Thus, Treitschke's support for, and to a degree the various arguments he makes to 
justify, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine are rooted in his belief that Germany's actions 
throughout the conflict are simply part of its larger destiny towards achieving unification. 
Consequently, Treitschke's belief in a predestined unified Germany functions as the 
overarching narrative through which he formulates his arguments for the annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine. Yet, within this overarching narrative, Treitschke offers an array of 
rationales for annexation, ranging from blood ties and historical grounds, to material 
necessity and the overwhelming strength of the German character. 
The majority of Treitschke's arguments are contained in an article he wrote before 
the war's end in August 1870 entitled "What We Demand From France." At the time in 
which the article was written the Germans had just defeated the French in the Battle of 
Gravelotte and the outcome of a German victory seemed likely. Thus, Treitschke wrote 
the article in response to these events and outlined what, he argued, should be Germany's 
war aims for what he saw as the inevitable German victory. Foremost in Treitschke's 
mind was that Germany must insist on the return of Alsace-Lorraine. 
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Treitschke believed that the impending German victory would create a more 
peaceful and secure world and as such it was Germany's duty to make sure this would 
happen. Germany, Treitschke contended, was a "peaceful nation" and as such the 
defeat of France and the creation of a united German Reich would contribute to a greater 
sense of security amongst the European powers. 
When our armies can sweep into the plains of Champagne in a few days' 
march, when the teeth of the wild beast are broken, and weakened France 
can no longer venture to attack us . . . the statesmen of the present day, 
whenever they have realized the altered equilibrium of the Powers, will 
feel that the strengthening of the boundaries of Germany contributes to the 
security of the peace of the world. We are a peaceful nation. The 
traditions of the Hohenzollerns, the constitution of our Army, the long and 
difficult work before us in the upbuilding of our united German State, 
forbid the abuse of our warlike power.14 
In Treitschke's view, any future annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany 
would not represent an abuse of power through war, but rather a righting of the injustices 
done by the French against Germany through the French seizure of the territories in 
earlier times. Treitschke's position was not uncommon in German intellectual circles of 
the day, especially those of the historical profession. As Phillipson observes, the 
perception of many German historians at the time was that Alsace-Lorraine had been part 
of the German dominions until France had gotten possession of it "by force or fraud."15 
In this light, German calls for annexation "amounted to no more than the vindication of 
an old inalienable right. Accordingly the Germans long held that the annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine would be a mere restoration-a Zuriickeroberung (a recapture) as 
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 163. 
Heinrich von Treitschke, "What We Demand From France." in Germany, France, Russia & Islam, 104. 
Phillipson, Alsace-Lorraine, 113. 
61 
distinguished from an Eroberung (a conquest)."16 As already stated, this position was 
common amongst much of the German historical establishment and thus reflective of 
historians of many political persuasions. 
For example, following Napoleon's capture at Sedan in the autumn of 1870, the 
eminent German historian Leopold von Ranke addressed the following remark to 
Adolphe Thiers stating, "It is against Louis XIV that we now have to wage war."17 
Ranke's remark was a reference to the French acts of aggression in the seventeenth 
century, which wrested the provinces from a disunited Germany. In his view it was 
incumbent upon Germany to undo that act.18 Similarly, also in 1870, the more liberal 
minded German historian, Theodor Mommsen, speaking of Germany's war aims in a 
series of letters addressed to the people of Italy and published in Milanese papers, wrote, 
"We ask something more than money. We claim territory; not French territory, but 
German . . . Melancholy is the tale of our neighbors appropriating Lorraine first, then 
Alsace. . . The feeble policy of our forefathers betrayed our land, our faith, and our 
language."19 In Mommsen's view, a German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a 
question of restoration and not of conquest. On this point he stated, "Let France keep her 
French territory intact, whether always hers or not we will not ask. We desire no 
conquests; we want what is our own, neither more nor less."20 
Like Ranke and Mommsen, Treitschke also argued that Germany's annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine was justified on historical grounds though his remarks on the subject 
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carried a more belligerent tone. The war in Treitschke's view had united Germany into a 
nation-state and as such had awakened the once dormant desires of its people to demand 
what was rightfully theirs: the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. Treitschke makes this point 
clear in his opening remarks in "What We Demand From France" stating, "The thought, 
however, which after first knocking timidly at our doors as a shamefaced wish, has in 
four swift weeks, grown to be the mighty war-cry of the nation, is no other than this: 
"Restore what you stole from us long ago; give back Alsace and Lorraine." 
Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Treitschke contends, is justified on historical 
grounds and as such represents "an undoing today of the crimes which France perpetrated 
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on our western lands two hundred years ago." It is important to remember that 
Treitschke's arguments are designed not only to justify the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
but also to convince his readers of the necessity of annexation. For example, with regard 
to what he terms the "political-economical" value the inclusion of these provinces into 
the greater German Reich would yield, Treitschke states the following. 
Our sober judgment cannot refuse to admit that nature has dealt with our 
country much more like a stepmother than a mother. The singularly 
barren outline of our shore coastline on the North Sea, and the course of 
most of our German rivers and hillsides, are just as unfavorable to political 
unity as they are to commerce. Only a few strips of our German soil can 
compare in natural fertility with wealthy Normandy, the luxurious plains 
of England, and the teeming cornfields of the interior of Russia. But here, 
in Alsace, there is a real German district, the soil of which, under favoring 
skies, is rich with blessings which as only a very few spots in the Upper 
Rhenish Palatinate and the mountain country of Baden enjoy. The unusual 
configuration of the country has made it possible to pierce canals through 
gaps in the mountains-magnificent waterways, from the Rhine to the basin 
of the Rhone and the Seine-such as German ground scarcely ever admits. 
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We are by no means rich enough to be able to renounce so precious a 
possession. 
Thus, in Treitschke's view, Germany as it existed in 1870, was lacking in a geography 
which lent itself to commercial growth and political unity. For Treitschke, the 
significance of Alsace-Lorriane is that its inclusion into the German Reich would 
enhance German unity through the particulars of its geographical formations, thereby 
stimulating a more unified German state. Furthermore, Treitschke's language in this 
passage is indicative of how his arguments are predicated upon his belief that Alsace and 
Lorraine, despite being under French rule in 1870, were in fact German territories. For 
example, in the previous passage's last line, in which Treitschke states that Germany 
cannot afford to "renounce so precious a possession" as Alsace-Lorraine, the implication 
is that a refusal on Germany's part to annex these provinces would be akin to disowning 
them. Thus, Treitschke's claim to the provinces was not solely limited to its political or 
commercial value but was rather based on his deep belief that Alsace and Lorraine was 
"German land."24 As such, these provinces, Treitschke states, are "ours by nature and 
history."25 
Treitschke's contention that Alsace and Lorraine were German territories was 
based on his view that they were German in character. Much of his discussion in "What 
We Demand From France" is focused on demonstrating this point. In Treitschke's view 
the German character of Alsace and Lorraine resided in both its geography and its 
culture. To convey this point Treitschke leads his readers on an imaginary journey 
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through the provinces thus hoping to appeal to their historic-romantic sensibilities. As 
Treitschke describes it, Alsace-Lorraine is: 
A glorious panorama of German scenery! This thought has most 
assuredly suggested itself to everyone who has stood, in the freshness of 
morning, when the shreds of mists still cling to the rocky summits upon 
the walls of Schlettstadt. High up on the mountains tower the dark pine-
forests, which are hardly known in the woodless Gaulish country; lower 
down, those bright chestnut woods, which no man who has once made the 
Rhine his home can bear to miss; on the slopes, the gardens of the vines; 
and down below, that undulating, odorous plain, the mere recollection of 
which charmed from Goethe in his old age glowing words of praise for his 
"glorious Alsace."27 
Along with the natural beauty and German history of the region, Treitschke goes 
so far as to contend, "Nature herself meant that the plain of the Upper Rhine should have 
a common destiny." This point, Treitschke contends, is apparent in the mountain walls 
of the provinces, which are of the "same formation" as their German counterpart.29 
Many of Treitschke's assertions of Alsace's German character are based on the 
fact that unlike its educated classes its peasants had retained their German language as 
well as old German customs and clothes. While in his earlier as well as later works, 
Treitschke claims that the character of a people is determined by the character of its 
upper classes, in "What We Demand From France" he extols the virtues of a national 
peasant culture and its importance for the national life of a state.30 On this point he 
states, 
Our new State owes its strength to the national idea. Its intention is to be 
an honest neighbor to every foreign nationality, a grasping adversary to 
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none; and for this reason it finds its western frontier indicated to it by the 
language and manners and life of the rural population. Every State is kept 
fresh and young from below. New forces never cease to arise out of the 
healthy depths of the peasant class, while the population of the towns 
swiftly changes, and the families of the upper classes either fall away or 
are carried off into other habitations. We Germans still continue to make 
this experience in the colonies of our Eastern frontier. Wherever we have 
succeeded in Germanising the peasant, our national life stands erect; 
wherever he has remained non-German, German ways of life wage to this 
•5 1 
day a struggle for their existence. 
Thus, for Treitschke it is the German peasant who both embodies the hope of a 
national future as well as defines the national boundaries between Germany and its 
neighbors. The importance of this point for Alsace-Lorraine, Treitschke contends, is that 
it reveals that the true division or border between France and Germany lies only 
westward in Lorraine where there is no German spoken and the customs and style are of a 
distinctly French nature. As Treitschke describes it: 
Applying this standard [of a rural population as an indicator of national 
boundaries], we shall find German and French nationality separated by a 
line, which may be roughly described as leading along the ridge of the 
Vosges to the source of the Saar, and thence to the north-west towards 
Diedenhofen and Longwy. What lies beyond is Gaulish. This boundary-
line, hard to be perceived in the hilly districts of Lorraine, is drawn with 
mathematical precision at several points of the Wasgau hills. Wandering 
westward from the busy little town of Wesserling in Upper Alsace, one 
first ascends through leafy woods, enjoying the view into the smiling 
valley of the Thur, and reaching at Urbes the river boundary, the frontier 
of the departement of the Upper Rhine. There the road leads through a 
long tunnel, and the moment the traveler passes out of the dark into the 
departement of the Vosges, he sees that the country and its inhabitants 
have undergone a complete change. The woods of Germany have 
vanished, and naked hills surround the valley of the infant Moselle. True, 
it is possible to guess, from the aspect of the tall peasants, from whom the 
French army draws so many fine-looking Cuirassiers, that many a drop of 
Germanic blood may flow in the veins of the population; but down at 
Boussang no word of German is spoken. The poorer fashion in which the 
31
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houses are built, the wooden shoes, and the cotton nightcap, at once betray 
French civilization. 
Treitschke's point is that Alsace and parts of Lorraine are clearly German territories. His 
description of the French character of Lorraine is meant to demonstrate this fact by 
contrasting the French qualities of this section of Lorraine with its more German-like 
Alsatian neighbors. That these provinces are German in character, Treitschke argues, is 
apparent through the abundance of German culture in the region. For example "Alsace," 
Treitschke states, "has always maintained an honorable place in the earlier history of 
German Art." The same, Treitschke argues, can be said of German literature, as "nearly 
all the noteworthy humorists of our earlier literature were native of Alsace, or, at all 
events, socially connected with the district."34 Indeed, "Everywhere in the gay little 
land," writes Treitschke, "there was German laughter, German humor, and lust of life."35 
Thus, for Treitschke the history of Alsace and Lorraine's German past is indicative of its 
eternal German character. Faced with this evidence Treitschke asks his readers: "Are we 
to believe that that rich millennium of German history has been utterly destroyed by two 
centuries of French dominion?"36 
Whereas much of Treitschke's arguments concerning German claims to Alsace-
Lorraine rested on the cultural, linguistic and geographic affinities of the region with 







assertion that the people of Alsace are ethnically German and as such their inclusion into 
the German state is both justified and inevitable. On this point he states the following. 
The people of Alsace are already beginning to doubt the invincibility of 
their nation, and at all events to divine the mighty growth of the German 
Empire. Perverse obstinacy, and a thousand French intrigues creeping in 
the dark, will make every step on the newly conquered soil difficult for us: 
but our ultimate success is certain, for on our side fights what is stronger 
than the lying artifices of the stranger-nature herself and the voice of 
common blood.37 
For Treitschke, the power of a "common blood" rendered the Alsatians own political 
preferences powerless in the face of Germany's destiny in becoming a unified State. 
Essentially, Treitschke's argument framed German claims to Alsace-Lorraine as the 
corollary of immutable historical and traditional forces, thereby appropriating the older 
romantic concept of the Volk.u 
Crudely translated the term "Volk" in German means people, yet its implication is 
much stronger than its literal translation. As George Mosse, a leading historian on 
volkish thought, describes it, 
"Volk" is one of those perplexing German terms, which connotes far more 
than its specific meaning. "Volk" is a much more comprehensive term 
than "people" for to German thinkers ever since the birth of German 
romanticism in the late 18th century "Volk" signified the union of a group 
of people with a transcendental "essence". This "essence" might be called 
"nature" or "cosmos" or "mythos," but in each instance it was fused to 
man's innermost nature, and represented the source of his creativity, his 
depth of feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other members of the 
"Volk."39 
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The concept of the Volk has, since its inception in the 18 century, largely focused on 
enhancing the unity of its members. Thus, despite its mystical pretensions, the Volk 
concept has often been appropriated for the practical political purpose of German unity. 
As Mosse describes it, volkish thought sought a spiritual Germanic revolution in which 
the unity of the German people would be realized.40 
The Volk concept primarily identified the German people by their racial and 
cultural affinities. As such the German people were held to have a close association with 
the soil, and exist as a community of shared language and common traditions.41 
Furthermore, volkish thought posited an organicist understanding of the nation which was 
contrary to the Western conception of the nation. As Dorpalen states, the Volk concept 
of a nation "does not derive its inspiration from an idea, from a fundamental agreement 
on basic values of law and morality; it envisages Germans as a natural organism, a 
primordial, elemental force."42 In this light, one's German identity is "indestructible and 
un-perishable."43 
Treitschke's adoption of the Volk concept to support the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine was never very explicit. Throughout his writings on the subject of annexation 
he never cited the term "Volk" directly. Yet, the concept of the Volk is evident 
throughout his arguments. All of his references to the German character of Alsace and 
Lorraine, whether based on its geography, art, literature, language, and ethnicity all 
reflect the Volkish belief that these provinces, despite their more recent history as French, 
retained their mystical German essence and as such were German in spirit. In 
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Treitschke's view, Dorpalen states, the Alsatians are in Fichte's words, Urvolk.44 They 
are continually "drawing strength from within [themselves] and forever remaining the 
same, untouched by the shifting political boundaries and by professions of allegiance to 
other 'peoples.'"45 On this point Treitschke states, 
What is it, speaking generally, that is healthy and energetic in Alsace? 
What is it that elevates these districts above the dark mists of self-
indulgence and priestly obscurantism, which overhang most of the 
remaining provinces of France? The German nature of Alsace, and the 
ineradicable impulse towards self-government, which even the artifices of 
Napoleonic prefects could not wholly banish, and which refused to bow its 
head before the monarchical socialism of the Second Empire, are 
German.46 
Interestingly, in his earlier work Treitschke had objected to the Volk concept as both 
"petty and parochial."47 His concern was more with the power of the state and less with 
the people that occupied it. Yet, the appeal of the Volk concept, with its emphasis on the 
primordial and unchanging character of all Germans, proved highly useful for Treitschke 
as it allowed him to call upon "new political vistas" from which he could base his 
demands for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.48 As Dorpalen states, by adopting the 
Volk concept, Treitschke, could now make the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine appear "as 
part of a sacred mission to restore all Germans to Germany."49 On this point Treitschke 
states the following: 
In view of our obligation to secure the peace of the world, who will 
venture to object that the people of Alsace and Lorraine do not want to 
44 
Urvolk roughly translated means "first people." Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was a German 
philosopher whose views were highly influential on German nationalism. Treitschke's relationship to 
Fichte will be further examined in chapter Five. 45
 Ibid, 170. 
46 
Treitschke, "What We Demand From France," 140-150. 
47 






belong to us? The doctrine of the right of all branches of the German race 
to decide on their own destinies, the plausible solution of demagogues 
without a fatherland, shiver to pieces in the presence of the sacred 
necessity of these great days. These territories are ours by the right of the 
sword, and we shall dispose of them in virtue of a higher right-the right of 
the German nation, which will not permit its lost children to remain 
strangers to the German Empire.50 
Thus, in Treitschke's view, the creation of a unified German nation-state, as sanctioned 
by the divine forces which underlay history, demanded that all those designated as 
"German" be integrated into the German Empire. Consequently, this context, Treitschke 
argues, renders the personal wishes or "the will" of the inhabitants of Alsace and 
Lorraine invalid in the face of the "moral" and "divine" forces guiding the events of the 
day. 
We Germans, who know Germany and France, know better than these 
unfortunates themselves what is good for the people of Alsace, who have 
remained under the misleading influence of their French connection 
outside the sympathies of new Germany. Against their will we shall 
restore them to their true selves. We have seen with joyful wonder the 
undying power of the moral forces of history, manifested far too 
frequently in the immense changes of these days, to place much 
confidence in the value of a mere popular disinclination.51 
The above passage demonstrates Treitschke's awareness that many an Alsatian and 
Lorrainer at the time were opposed to the prospect of an annexation into the German 
empire. As such they would likely be opposed to Treitschke's assertion that they were 
German and as such should be forcibly annexed into a greater a German Reich.52 
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Thus, Treitschke's argument that the will of the Alsatians is inconsequential is a way of 
reconciling this reality with his position. In Treitschke's view the Alsatians' sense of 
their German character had become corrupted as a result of French influence and rule. 
Their annexation into the German empire would represent not only a restoration of "lost 
children" back to their motherland but also a restoration of the Alsatians' sense of their 
true German Volk. By appealing to the eternal and unchanging character of the German 
identity Treitschke could justify the annexation of the people of Alsace-Lorraine against 
their will. For Treitschke, this combination of Germany's drive to nationhood, national 
honor and a recognition of Alsace's German history and character demanded that the 
inhabitants of Alsace be reincorporated back into the German Empire despite any 
opposition on their part. 
The spirit of a nation lays hold, not only of the generations, which live 
beside it, but of those which are before it and behind it. We appeal from 
the mistaken wishes of the men who are there today to the wishes of those 
who were there before them. We appeal to all those strong German men 
who once stamped the seal of our German nature on the language and 
manners, the art and the social life, of the Upper Rhine. Before the 
nineteenth century closes the world will recognize that the spirits of Erwin 
von Steinbach and Sebastian Brandt are still alive, and that we were only 
obeying the dictates of national honor when we made little account of the 
preferences of the people who live in Alsace today.53 
For Treitschke, the issue of Alsace-Lorraine was inextricably bound to that of German 
unification. In many respects Treitschke, in his demand for the annexation of the 
provinces, portrays himself and others of like mind, as similar to doctors treating a sick 
Into Conflict Over the Region of Alsace," Karen Russell Brienza (M.A.Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 
1987), 105. 
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patient (Alsace), who not knowing what is best for itself, is forced to take medicine it 
might not want but requires. 
All our hope rests on the re-awakening of the free German spirit. When 
once the mother-tongue is taught, purely and honestly-when the 
Evangelical Church can again move about in undisturbed liberty-when an 
intelligent German provincial Press brings back the country to the 
knowledge of German life-the cure of its sickness will have begun.54 
In Treitschke's view, despite their present opposition to annexation, the Alsatians in time 
would come to feel differently and would embrace their restored sense of German 
identity. This reality was dictated by nature itself as manifested in the individuals' sense 
of their own ethnic and hence national identity. 
I tell you that the instinct of nature and the call of the blood will speak in 
Alsace, the call of the blood, which has already brought so many lost sons 
of our great Fatherland to our Empire. I tell you the day will come when, 
in the most distant villages of the Vosges, the German peasant will say, "It 
is a happiness and an honor to be a citizen of the German Empire."55 
One consequence of Treitschke's demand for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 
according to the German character of its people, was that it revealed an inherent 
inconsistency within his argument. As Dorpalen points out, if the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine represented a sacred mission to restore all Germans to Germany then, "such a 
mission must likewise apply to Germans in Austria, Russia, Switzerland, or the 
Netherlands; by making the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine a matter of political principle 
the door was thrown open to many another territorial demand."56 In spite of this, 
Treitschke rejected the idea that it was the task of German statecraft to force all those 
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designated as German in character back into the greater Reich.57 Yet, Treitschke's 
writings concerning Alsace-Lorraine ultimately contradict his position as they are littered 
with arguments which could lend themselves to territorial claims on any country with a 
German descended population. Dorpalen explains this contradiction in Treitschke's 
thought as a result of, 
his ingrained tendency of "idealistically" raising practical considerations 
to matters of general principle. By endowing them with the halo of an 
imperishable Volkstum [Treitschke] appeared to give them a validity far 
beyond their original range. This range extended even further by his 
readiness to seize upon any argument at hand which would serve his 
ends.58 
Thus, this apparent inconsistency is indicative of Treitschke's long-standing habit of 
discarding "for the argument of the moment long-held views and prejudices which might 
weaken his case."59 
Despite his intellectual dishonesty, Treitschke's arguments concerning the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine are mostly consistent with his conception of the state. His 
contention that the preferences of the Alsatians and Lorrainers are inconsequential in the 
face of the divinely sanctioned process, by which the German state was achieving 
unification, is consistent with his belief in the overwhelming superiority of the state over 
the individual. Treitschke's call for the subjugation of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to the 
needs of the German empire is the application of his maxim in Politics that the individual 
is subservient to the authority of the state as a legal, moral and military power. Indeed, as 








was his unshakable, religious conviction of the need for a great and strong German 
state."60 Thus, Treitschke's response to the Franco-Prussian war and his demand for the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine were largely determined by "his state-centered 
perspective, which refused to acknowledge the validity of any supranational values."61 In 
Treitschke's view there could be no law superseding the needs of the Prusso-German 
state. By making the state to be the "ultimate source of all moral energies," Treitschke, 
Dorpalen writes, "had to deny the existence of any moral ties transcending state 
boundaries."62 Treitschke's denial of a standard of universal values applicable to 
humanity in its entirety is rooted in the tradition of German philosophy of history known 
as historicism. As such, following an examination of Renan's writings in the Franco-
Prussian war, the discussion will examine the fundamental tenets of historicism and its 
historical progression up to and during the time of Treitschke. In doing so it will 
demonstrate how German historicist thought functioned as the intellectual foundation for 
Treitschke's view of the state and nationalism. 
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Chapter Four: Renan, the Franco-Prussian war and Alsace-Lorraine 
Like Treitschke, Renan wrote extensively during the period of the Franco-
Prussian war and in the period immediately following it. Many of his criticisms on 
German claims to Alsace-Lorraine are to be found in his correspondence and complete 
works that were inspired by, what for Renan, were the disastrous events of the day. The 
following analysis of Renan's writing from this period reveals that these events, 
specifically Germany's claims over and eventual annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, acted as 
the catalyst for his discussion on nationality. Indeed, within Renan's writings from this 
period one can discern the germs of the arguments he would develop, twelve years after 
the war's end, in What is a nation?. 
The effect of the outbreak of hostilities between France and Prussia upon Renan 
was immense. Since the crisis of faith that dominated his youth-in which Renan had 
rejected the life of the priesthood-he had throughout his life turned to German 
philosophy and literature as a source of inspiration. In his own words, "Germany was my 
mistress."1 
Renan first discovered German philosophy as a young student. For Renan, the 
philosophy of men such as Goethe, Kant and Herder represented the very antithesis of the 
scholasticism that had been forced upon him during his seminary years.2 Describing his 
attraction to the great minds of German philosophical thought, Renan writes of "a secret 
instinct, a love without acquaintance that bears me toward Germany to see if I may there 
Martha E. Bernstein, "Intellectual Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Ernest Renan and Emile 
Zola: Traitors or Patriots?" (M.A. Thesis., Concordia University, 1993), 28. 
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find my form." Renan's attraction to Germany lay in what he saw as its respect for 
learning, its emphasis on scientific progress, the religious character of its free-thought, 
and in general the seriousness of its people. For Renan, the quality of French intellectual 
thought revealed itself as superficial in comparison to the giants of German philosophy. 
His contempt for the ideas of French writers, such as Saint-Marc Giradin, whom he 
referred to as an "imbecile" and "the most nauseating creature I know", is indicative of 
both the frustration he felt towards French writing and his attraction to German 
philosophy.4 Indeed, referring to those of his contemporaries whose ideas he rejected in 
favor of German philosophy, he stated, "I rage against them all. Germany! Germany! 
Germany! Goethe, Herder, Kant."5 In his own work Renan routinely turned to those 
aspects of German thought which he could assimilate to his own needs.6 Thus, long 
before 1870, Renan's Germanism was a strong influence upon his intellectual thought. 
His admiration for German thought and culture largely influenced his reaction to the 
events of the war and in turn incited a personal crisis in which Renan was forced to 
reconcile his love for German culture with the invading power destroying his homeland. 
For Renan, the war between France and Germany was particularly devastating, as 
he had always envisioned the two countries as united in an intellectual, moral and 
political union working together for the common good of humanity. The outbreak of war 
put an end to this idealistic dream. In his biography of Renan, H.W. Wardman equates 
Renan's state of mind at this time to the crisis of faith he experienced as a young man and 
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It is in fact no exaggeration to say that for him the war brought a crisis as 
serious as his crisis of faith. Once again the world lay in ruins. This one 
was his vision of France and Prussia working together in accordance with 
the ideals of scholars and intellectuals. German culture had been his 
mainstay during his crisis of faith. It did not lose its value in his eyes 
because of the war. But he needed to believe that devotion to scholarship 
made a difference to the world and the war made him realize that it had 
not. He wanted to believe that the world was a place in which idealists 
triumph. The war showed him that the world was not like that and he 
never fully recovered from the shock.7 
A good example of Renan's deep sense of disappointment with the war can be discerned 
from a letter he sent to his Swiss friend, Charles Ritter, in September 1871.8 By this 
point the French forces had been soundly defeated and Germany had formally acquired 
the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine as stipulated in the Treaty of Frankfurt. Prussian forces 
had wreaked havoc throughout France, in particular during the three-month siege of 
Paris, and continued to occupy many parts of the country. Furthermore, following the 
French elections to the National Assembly the previous February, Paris was on the verge 
of civil war as the newly installed Third Republic attempted to repress the Commune 
government that would shortly come to take complete control of the French capital.9 
Reflecting on these events Renan's letter carries a despondent tone as he detailed what he 
believed was to be the war's dire outcome. 
I am writing at this moment several reflections on the present situation; 
these are probably the last pages of politics that I will ever write. All that 
I have dreamed, desired, and preached turn out to be chimerical. I had 
H.W. Wardman, Ernest Renan: A Critical Biography (London: The Athlone Press, 1964), 113. Wardman 
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made it my goal in life to work for the intellectual, moral, and political 
union of Germany and France. But there was the criminal folly of the 
overthrown government [the Second Empire], the patriotic excesses of the 
Germans, and the Prussian pride which have marked out between France 
and Germany an abyss that will not be closed up for centuries.10 
Thus, Renan's admiration for German culture and his hope for a joint Franco-German 
unity, forced him to confront the reality of the war's outcome thereby inciting a personal 
internal struggle within him. Of particular significance for Renan were the issues of 
Alsace-Lorraine and the forced annexation of the regions' inhabitants into the German 
Empire. Describing the inner conflict he was experiencing, he wrote, 
I am not able to gainsay what I have said in full conscience and counsel 
hate when I have counseled love. I must say with Goethe: "How would 
you have me preach hate when I do not feel it in my heart?" I am not able, 
however, to say to my compatriots, when two million Frenchmen [in 
Alsace and Lorraine] ask their countrymen to restore them to France, not 
to listen to them. I will be silent.1' 
Thus, even in the face of what for Renan was Germany's gravest transgression, the forced 
annexation of his fellow countrymen in Alsace-Lorraine, he could not deny his original 
mistress that was German culture. Renan's vow to remain silent was his attempt to 
convey his feeling that he could not preach a hatred of Germany he did not feel, nor could 
he overlook the injustice being perpetrated against the wills of those Alsatians and 
Lorrainers who wished to remain Frenchmen. Yet, as stated earlier, Renan's vow of 
silence in this passage was only offered in the war's dying days and after he had written a 
considerable amount during a period in which the conflict was still very much active. 
Ernest Renan, to Charles Ritter, 11 March 1871, in Paul Corcoran, "The Political Thought of Ernest 




Renan's first formal publication during the war was an article entitled 'La Guerre 
entre la France et 1' Allemagne' which was published in the Revue des Deux Mondes on 
15 September 1870. While the article was published following the French defeat at 
Sedan, it is believed that Renan wrote the piece before the decisive battle. This point 
may explain how in the article Renan remained optimistic about the possibility of a future 
reconciliation between the two countries, despite the ongoing hostilities between 
Germany and his native France. Contrary to the vitriolic and often belligerent patriotic 
sentiment flowing out of both countries at this time, Renan's article was "liberal, 
internationalist and sane."13 In it Renan argued that France was the aggressor in the war 
and that if Prussia were treated more liberally, it would respond by being less aggressive. 
Prussia, Renan argued, must also show moderation by giving up its claim to Alsace-
Lorraine thereby restoring the balance of power between the two countries. Moreover, 
Renan advised that a league of neutrals should intervene and act as arbitrator between the 
two countries, thereby ending the conflict and bringing a just peace.14 The war, Renan 
argued, had broken the "intellectual, moral and political harmony" that existed between 
France and Germany. Yet, this break, Renan believed, was not irrevocable. Perhaps, 
Renan's choice of parable best illustrates his belief that despite the enmity between the 
two warring nations they would, in the future, still be united by a common nature. 
I have read, I do not remember where, the parable of two brothers who, no 
doubt in the time of Cain and Abel, came to hate each other, and resolved 
to battle each other to the point that they would no longer be brothers. 
When, exhausted, they fell together on the ground, they found they were 
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still brothers, neighbors, tributaries from the same well, dwellers along the 
same stream. 
About this same time Renan began what would become a lengthy and public exchange 
with David Friedrich Strauss, then Germany's foremost philologist and biblical scholar. 
Renan had for some time admired Strauss and had already agreed to write the preface for 
Strauss's new book on Voltaire that was to be published in France.16 The correspondence 
between the two men started through a congratulatory letter Renan had sent Strauss 
following the book's publication at the end of July 1870. Renan saw the letter as an 
opportunity to express his dismay over the outbreak of hostilities between the two men's 
native countries. On 18 August 1870, Strauss replied to Renan by publishing an open 
letter in the Gazette d'Augsbourg suggesting that the two men take part in a frank and 
dispassionate discussion about the causes and significance of the war.17 Despite the 
inviting tone of his letter, Strauss's view of the conflict was both biased and nationalistic. 
In Strauss' opinion the war could not have been avoided. Furthermore, he believed that 
the Prussian victories represented a "just punishment for French arrogance and proof of 
the vitality of Prussian culture as compared with the decadence of the French."18 Despite 
Strauss's partisan view of the war Renan remained positive by this seeming opportunity 
for a French and German scholar to consider the conflict between their two countries 
from a "philosophical point of view."19 Renan subsequently had Strauss's letter 
Renan, "Guerre", in Corcoran, 212. 
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translated and published in the Debats on 15 September 1870.20 Following this Renan 
wrote his own reply to Strauss, which was published in the same journal on the sixteenth. 
Renan's letter was respectful in tone-he addressed Strauss as a "learned master"-
assuming that Strauss would follow his example and publish his letter in a German paper, 
so that "the voice of reason urging moderation on the [German] militarists would make 
itself heard."21 Much like his letter in the Revue des Deux Mondes, Renan argued for 
Germany's moderation toward France while still recognizing the need for its unification. 
Moreover, Renan repeated his call for the return of Alsace-Lorraine as this, he wrote, was 
necessary "to the harmony of the world."22 Renan's reasoning on this point was that the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine would dismember France to a degree in which it would no 
longer be able to provide its necessary influence to maintain a European balance of 
power. Thus, Renan urged Strauss to view the conflict philosophically writing that: "If 
success absolves everything, the Prussian government is entirely absolved; but we are 
philosophers; we are naive enough to believe that he who succeeds may be partly to 
blame." Hoping to appeal to the fellow biblical scholar in Strauss, Renan reminded 
him, that "war is a tissue of sins and an unnatural state" and that there is "a world 
superior to hatred, jealousy and pride."24 In this same spirit Renan urged Strauss that 
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their pride are oblivious, swayed as they are by their eternal and highly unphilosophical 
forgetfulness of death." 
On 2 October 1870, the German journal the Gazette d 'Augsbourg published 
Strauss's response while refusing to print Renan's letter. At the time Renan was unaware 
of both Strauss's response and the fact that his letter had gone unpublished with it, as 
Paris had been under siege since 20 September making communications with the outside 
world impossible.26 Moreover, the tone of Strauss's second letter was more belligerent 
than his first, as he ridiculed Renan's claim that Alsace and Lorraine belonged to France. 
Arrogant and boastful of Germany's progress in the war, Strauss, mocked Renan's 
pacifistic pleas, stating: "If you had spoken so to your French people, O Ernest Renan, 
and converted them to your peaceful beliefs, our soldiers would not soon be drinking 
choice French wines in Paris."27 
In April 1871, upon learning of Strauss's second letter and the fact that his own 
had gone unpublished, Renan was furious by what he saw as Strauss's moral deception. 
Thus, he went to work on a second letter to Strauss, which was published in November 
1871.28 By this time, Renan had developed some hindsight having lived through the 
French defeat and the traumatic experiences of the Siege of Paris and the Commune. In 
his second letter to Strauss Renan identifies the opposing ideological conceptions of a 
Strauss regretted that the journal chose not to print Renan's letter but he nonetheless allowed his reply to 
appear alone. The three letters were eventually published in pamphlet form a few weeks later under the 
title War and Peace and sold for the benefit of wounded German soldiers. Wardman, Ernest Renan, 118-
119. 
27 Strauss to Renan, 29 September 1870, letter, in Bernstein, "Intellectual Reactions," 46. 
28 
Wardman, Ernest Renan, 124. It is unknown why Renan only learned of Strauss's second letter seven 
months after it was published. A likely explanation is the general disarray of Parisian life during this 
period as the city had been under siege by the Prussians, which was followed by the Commune. While 
Renan's second letter was published in November it was dated 15 September 1871. 
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nation that guide French and German political styles. Whereas France, Renan contends, 
is guided by a view of the nation, and of itself, as a "grand secular association" united by 
"common interests," German politics, as evidenced by its annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 
is based upon an ethnographic view of the nation, in which race and language function as 
the criteria by which a nation is defined.29 Prefiguring many of the points he would 
make eleven years later in "What is a nation?" Renan warns those who subscribe to this 
ethnographic view of humanity of both the fallacy of its claims when put under scientific 
scrutiny, as well as the dangers such a view may yield in the future. 
Our politics is the politics of the right of nations. Yours is the politics of 
races. We believe that ours is preferable. The absolutely distinct division 
of humanity into races, beside the fact that it rests on a scientific error, 
very few countries possessing a truly pure race, can only lead to wars of 
extermination, to "zoological" wars, permit me to say, analogous to those 
that the diverse species of rodents or carnivores indulge in throughout life. 
This would be the end of this fertile melange, composed of numerous and 
completely necessary elements, that we call humanity. You have raised 
before the world the flag of ethnographic and archeological politics. This 
politics will be fatal to you. Comparative philology, which you have 
created and which you have mistakenly transported to the field of politics, 
will play a dirty trick on you.30 
Thus, by employing an abbreviated form of the same means of comparative analysis he 
would in "What is a nation? " Renan argues that to view a nation as defined by the race 
or language of its constituent population is to ignore the reality of the makeup of modern 
European nations. These nations, Renan argues, are often composed of members who 
speak multiple languages and belong to several ethnic groups and have existed as such 
for some time. 
Nation is not synonymous with race. Little Switzerland, so solidly built, 
counts three languages, three or four races, and two regions. A nation is a 
grand secular association (not eternal) between more or less equal related 
Ernest Renan to David Frederich Strauss, 15 September 1871, letter, in Corcoran, 233-234. 
Ibid, 233-234. 
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provinces forming a nucleus, around which gather other provinces tied one 
to another by common interests, or by accepted ancient facts, which have 
become interests. England, which is the most nearly perfect of nations, is 
the most muddled, from the point of view of ethnography and history. 
Pure Bretons, Romanized Bretons, Irish Caledonians, Anglo-Saxons, 
i t 
Danish, pure Normands, Frankish Normands, are all confounded in it. 
Turning his attention to German claims to Alsace-Lorraine, Renan attempted to 
demonstrate to Strauss the fallacious logic of the then popular German view, that 
Germany's annexation of the provinces was justified according to a German historical 
right. 
If one does not admit a statute of limitations for the violence of the past, 
there will be endless war. Lorraine had been part of the German Empire, 
without doubt; but Holland, Switzerland, Italy herself, and if we go back 
beyond the treaty of Verdun (843), the whole of France including 
Catalonia, formed part of the German Empire. Alsace today is a German 
country by language and race; but before it was invaded by the Germans, 
Alsace like a great portion of southern Germany, was Celtic. We do not 
conclude from this fact that southern Germany ought to be French; but we 
do not wish to be told that by ancient right Metz and Luxembourg ought to 
be German. Nobody could say where this archeology might end. Almost 
everywhere that the enthusiastic German patriots claim a German right, 
we could claim a previous Celtic right. And before the Celtic period there 
were Finnish and Laplandish tribes and before them the cave dwellers; and 
before them orangutans. With such a philosophy of history there would 
exist no legitimate right in the world except that of the orangutans, who 
were unjustly disposed by the perfidy of the civilized peoples. 
Thus, Renan's analysis upon the question of historical right, as a means on which to base 
a national right, is much like the one he would make in What is a nation?. In Renan's 
31
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view neither race, nor language nor culture are a legitimate criterion for the annexation of 
a people against their will. The fate of the Alsatians, Renan argues, should be determined 
according to their own wishes and desires, not by "abstractions" of what constitutes a 
people by an invading power that pays little heed to those they are seeking to control. 
Let us be less absolute: besides the right of the dead, let us admit a little 
the right of the living.. . Europe is a confederation of states united by the 
common idea of civilization. The individuality of each nation is 
constituted no doubt by its race, its language, its history, its religion, but 
also by something much more tangible, by an actual agreement, by the 
will of the various provinces of the state to live together... Alsace is 
German by language and race, but she does not wish to belong to the 
German state; that settles the question. One speaks of the right of France, 
of the right of Germany. These abstractions mean much less to us than the 
right of the Alsatians, living human beings, to obey a power to which they 
consent.33 
Thus, for Renan, Germany's failure to consider the wishes of the Alsatians contradicted 
the very principles, which he believed bound Europe as a civilization. Nationhood, 
Renan argues, must be based upon the wishes of the nation's inhabitants. He states, "We 
do not admit the cession of souls. If the ceded territories were deserts, that would be fine. 
But the men who inhabit them are free creatures, and our duty is to see that they are 
respected as such."34 
While the wording of the above passage is dissimilar to Renan's conception of the 
nation in What is a nation?, his identification of a nation as a non-eternal, secular 
community united by its member's common interests and sense of shared past, are all 
points he would reiterate and expand upon in his 1882 lecture. Thus, Renan's exchange 
with Strauss served as the first forum in which he would begin to formulate his views on 
what it is that constitutes a nation. For Renan, the traumatic experience of the Franco-
Ernest Renan, to David Friederich Strauss, 15 September 1871, letter, in Corcoran, 233. 
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Prussian war, and more specifically Germany's claims to and eventual annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine, served as the stimulus for his thoughts on nationality. Yet, while the 
subject of Alsace-Lorraine may have acted as the catalyst for Renan's work on 
nationality, his concern was not solely limited to the fate of the region but rather with 
what German claims to Alsace-Lorraine represented for European civilization. 
Renan recognized that the age he was living in was to be dominated by nations 
and their concomitant nationalisms. His concern was the categorization of nation-states 
according to an ethnic or linguistic criteria. Referring to German claims to Alsace-
Lorraine according to such a view Renan wrote, "There was . . . in this fact, which in the 
seventeenth century shocked no one, the germ of a grave embarrassment for the epoch 
when the ideas of nationalities would become the mistress of the world and would take, 
in questions of territorial delimitations, language and race as the criteria of legitimacy."35 
Thus, for Renan, Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, as justified by 
arguments over historical right, ethnicity or language, or a combination of the three, 
represented a movement away from the internationalist ideals he hoped would guide 
Europe into the future. In Renan's view, France had created the idea of nationality by 
opposing and breaking down the Roman Empire. As such he considered it her 
"spiritual" duty, her national mission, to reintroduce a higher form of European political 
unity. Indeed, "Renan's explicit goal," states Corcoran, 
was a United States of Europe, formed by international cooperation, not 
national, racial or cultural hegemony. Such peace and cooperation seemed 
to be lost in the Franco-Prussian War. Germany had defaulted in her 
Cited in Henriette Psichari, "Renan et la Guerre de 70," in Corcorn, 232. 
A claim Renan repeats in "What is a nation?" 
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responsibility, imposed by reason, as the strongest nation to guarantee 
peace on the basis of comity of interest rather than supremacy of power. 
Renan contended that the war between France and Germany had started because, 
"the different European nations are too independent from each other and have no 
authority above them. There exists neither congress nor a parliament which would be 
superior to national sovereignties."39 In his article from September 1870, Renan had 
called for the establishment of such an organization hoping that future wars such as the 
one he was witnessing could be avoided.40 For Renan, the creation of such a power was 
necessary to counter the threat of the rising tide of nationalism, as a united European 
federation could stand above national interests and prevent future conflict. On this point 
he wrote, 
The principle of independent nationalities is not, as some think, capable of 
freeing mankind from the scourge of war. On the contrary, I have always 
felt that the principle of nationalities, substituted for the mild and paternal 
symbol of legitimacy, made the conflicts of nations degenerate into 
exterminations of races, and put an end to those tempers and polite 
attitudes which the small and political and dynastic wars of other times 
allowed. One will be able to end wars only after joining to the principle of 
nationalities the one principle, which can correct it, the principle of a 
European federation, superior to all the nationalities. Then the democratic 
Ernest Renan, "La Guerre entre la France et L'Allemagne," in Hans Kohn, The Making of the Modern 
French Mind, 153. 
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questions, differentiated from the questions of pure policy and diplomacy, 
would regain their importance.41 
In Renan's view, the Franco-Prussian war had cast doubt upon Europe's ability to 
progress toward a form of multi-nationalism. For Renan, the war, Corcoran writes, 
"seemed to reaffirm Europe's inability to organize itself according to any other idea than 
the unitary conquest exampled by classical and Christian Roman imperialism. The 
telling indicator for Renan was Germany's insistence upon annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine."42 
Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine loomed so large in Renan's response to 
the Franco-Prussian war because it symbolized both the triumph of the "ethnographic 
politics" he despised as well as his dashed hope for a European order guided by a multi-
national coalition of the Western European powers. His discussion on the nation and 
nationality, initiated by his dialogue with Strauss, was his reaction to what he saw as the 
encroaching hold by what he would later term those "transcendants of politics" which 
could justify territorial expansion according to a faulty view of the nation.43 
As to Renan's legacy, from the time of the Franco-Prussian war, it is decidedly 
mixed. While his experience and writings from the war were significant for his work on 
nationality, his non-partisan philosophical approach to the conflict provoked the ire of 
many of his fellow compatriots. Both at the time of the Franco-Prussian war and in the 
years since the conflict, Renan, has often been criticized as being unpatriotic. Two points 
in Renan's response to the conflict have accounted for his reputation as a "traitor" or 
Ibid, 155-156. 
Corcoran, "The Political Thought of Ernest Renan" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1969), 232. 
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"collaborator": his Germanism and his attack on democracy. Both feature prominently 
in what would be Renan's last major work from this time, La Reforme intellectuelle et 
morale, which was published on 6 November 1871. 
La Reforme intellectuelle et morale was Renan's response to what he saw as the 
ills that had befallen France and which, he argued, had partially contributed to its defeat 
in 1871. The essay is divided into two parts: I. Le Mai and II. Les remedes. France's 
malady, Renan contends, is a weakness of moral fiber. This weakness, Renan argues, 
was in great part a result of the moral inefficiency of the French Catholic education 
system with its contempt for learning, and scientific knowledge. The rejection of 
scientific thought, Renan argued, had particularly crippled France, as no modern nation 
could be militarily prepared without it. Furthermore, Renan believed that French society 
had come to be dominated by a materialism, equalitarianism, civic irresponsibility and 
general lack of selfless devotion to thepatrie, all vices he attributed to the country's 
revolutionary heritage.45 As for the remedies Renan offered to quell this crisis, these 
included: the restoration of a strongly authoritarian-though still constitutional-monarchy 
which would be supported by a social hierarchy consisting of a nobility, scientists, 
scholars and the army.46 
Interestingly, La Reforme's undemocratic tone and Germanism, the two elements 
for which Renan was to be most criticized, were interconnected. Renan's abandonment 
of a classic liberalism, which held that some degree of division and discord were 
necessary for the establishment of true freedom for both the individual within a state and 
44 
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the state as it exists among other states, was based upon his belief that the French defeat 
by Prussia in 1870 was the result of corrupt attitudes instilled in the French by their 
Revolution. Renan feared that France was becoming a "second-rate America," a nation 
which, in his view, was barbaric and uncultured and prided commerce above all else. In 
order for France to change its course domestically and prosper as a great nation 
internationally, Renan argued that the country had "to reshape itself on the very power 
that had defeated her: Prussia."47 Renan makes this point explicit in La Reforme stating, 
"There exists an excellent model of the manner in which a nation can lift itself up from 
the most extreme disasters. It is Prussia herself who gives us this example."48 More 
specifically, Renan equates the French experience of the Franco-Prussian war with the 
Prussian experience following the Peace of Tilsit, in which Prussia was stripped of half 
its territory and suffered a sense of national humiliation.49 For Renan the analogous 
nature of these historical situations as well as the social structure of Prussian society 
made Prussia an example that France should emulate. Ironically, Renan particularly 
admired the Prussian military class and the fact that it was born out of its hereditary 
nobility.50 Moreover, Renan argued that the regeneration of France should be led by the 
intellectuals, just as "the University of Berlin was the centre of the regeneration in 
Ernest Renan, "La Reforme intellectuelle et morale," in "The Political Thought of Ernest Renan", Paul 
Corcoran (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1969), 216. 
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Germany" following its national humiliation in 1807.51 Renan suggested that Prussia 
"offer[ed] the best model" for the type of society that would come out of his proposed 
reforms.52 While this society might have existed as an ideal in his mind, Renan saw the 
Prussian example as the closest representation to "the developed and corrected ancien 
regime."52. In this society, Renan states, 
The individual is taken, elevated, fashioned, trained, disciplined, 
unceasingly demanded of by a society deriving from the past, molded in 
ancient institutions, arrogating itself as the mistress of morality and 
reason. The individual in this system gives enormously to the State. He 
receives in exchange from the State a strong moral and intellectual culture, 
as well as the joy of participating in a grand work. Those societies are 
particularly noble, they create science, they guide the human spirit, they 
make history; but they are from time to time enfeebled by the reclamations 
of individual egoism, which finds the burden that the State imposes upon 
him too heavy to carry.54 
As Chadbourne describes it, Renan's championing of the Prussian model can best be 
described as a call for a revanche superieure.55 Renan, Chadbourne writes, was not 
calling for "military revenge, but a more complex and subtle type (revanche superieure), 
which consists of assimilating from a victorious enemy qualities that will enable her 
victim to emerge with renewed moral and intellectual superiority."56 
For some, Renan's advocacy in La Reforme of the Prussian model for the newly 
defeated French regime, presents a paradox when contrasted with his hatred for German 
Renan, "La Reforme," in Ernest Renan, H.W. Wardman, 128. While it is tempting to point out the irony 
in Renan's choice of Treitschke's University of Berlin, as the example which French intellectuals should 
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racial politics. As one of his later biographers, H.W. Wardman wrote, "It is curious . . 
.that in the preface [of La Reforme, Renan] announces his entire disillusionment with 
Germany and German nationalism. The Reforme was an odd way of showing this 
disillusionment, with its admiration for Prussian discipline, moral and intellectual, not to 
mention chastity!"57 
Indeed, what makes Renan's championing of the Prussian model so odd is that his 
work on nationality consistently attacked Prussian style "ethnographic politics." 
Chadbourne explains Renan's ability to reconcile these two facets of Prussian life, by 
claiming that Renan had subscribed to the belief that there are "two Germanies": 
The gentler, more liberal and humanistic Germany of the "moral German" 
(I'Allemand moral) and the ironhanded, force-worshiping Germany of the 
"corrupt German" (I'Allemand demoralise) symbolized by Prussia. Renan 
believed that the former would eventually purge the latter: La Prusse 
passera, VAllemagne restera. 
Renan was not alone in his admiration of German society. Indeed, many French 
intellectuals of the period, at least prior to the outbreak of war, "held a deep interest in 
and admiration for German culture, and evinced great sympathy for the German 
movement towards freedom and unity."59 Thus, for many French intellectuals, the 
outbreak of war "aroused the utmost consternation" as many of them "cast about 
desperately for a just peace while many others were in two minds."60 While the French 
defeat in 1871 led to the development of anti-German sentiments throughout France this 
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did not translate into a yearning for military confrontation with Germany. Indeed, as 
Robert Gildea states: "Revenge against Germany was talked about after 1870, but only to 
maintain the illusion of French greatness, never as a viable option."6 On the contrary, 
the German military and political superiority inspired French intellectuals and politicians 
to emulate German successes.62 For instance, French historians Gabriel Monod (1844-
1913) and Hippolyte Taine (1828-93) strove to understand the conflict from an impartial 
perspective.63 Monod's memoir of the conflict, Allemands et Frangais (1871) was 
"surprisingly free of bias"64 and Taine began to explore the past to find the possible 
causes of German superiority.65 Four years after the French defeat a young Ernest 
Lavisse, then a student in Gottingen, who would later become the foremost French 
nationalist historian of the Third Republic, began his historical career by investigating the 
reasons for Prussian military and political superiority.66 Lavisse's motivation, writes 
Pierre Nora, was the "enigma of the German victory," he "wanted to reveal to his 
vanquished compatriots the secret of their defeat."67 Moreover, like Renan, Lavisse 
admired the way in which German universities took responsibility for shaping the public 
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spirit. Lavisse's position, Nora states, was that German institutions should not be 
"servilely imitated" but that, 
they were to be transplanted into French soil in such a way as to preserve 
what was essential, namely, the link between knowledge and patriotism. 
Lavisse explicitly stated that in creating his monumental history of France 
and in drafting new programs of primary education, his goal was the same: 
to transmit that pietas ergapatriam [piety towards the fatherland] that 
gave Germany its strength. 8 
Thus, while Renan may have been the only French scholar to openly advocate the 
Prussian model, the concept of revanche superieure seems to have motivated other 
French historians of the period as well. Moreover, like Renan, Taine and Lavisse could 
never reconcile themselves to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Their positions on the subject 
echo many of the points Renan made in his case against annexation. For example, Taine 
considered the attitude of the Alsatians and Lorrainers as the most important point to be 
considered in light of calls for their annexation, a point Renan makes both in his letters to 
Strauss and later in What is a nation?69 Lavisse's position, that any conquest that forces 
human beings against their will is unjust, was also a persistent theme in Renan's writings 
on the subject."70 Like Renan, Lavisse saw the issue of Alsace-Lorraine as one of 
international morality in which Germany had done an injustice to the French people. 
Lavisse portrays France itself as representing the interests of humanity writing: 
Against an Empire founded on force and sustained by it, an Empire that 
has sacrificed the rights of thousands of men to the rules of strategy, the 
French Republic stands for those violated rights. If, some day, in a great 
European melee, it reclaims the territory stripped from the indivisible 
Fatherland, it will be able to do so in the name of humanity... Since that 
dreadful year [1871 ] I have not for one minute given up hope. I have 
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tirelessly preached that hope, and the confidence I feel, to millions of 
children. I have said that we have a permanent duty to the lost provinces, 
and repeated it often. Strasbourg's spire has never vanished from my 
horizon. To me it has always stood apart, soaring heavenward: "I am 
Strasbourg, I am Alsace, I salute you, I am waiting." 
The defeat of 1871 effected a fundamental change in the traditional modes of 
thought on the question of nationalism in France. Following the war French nationalism 
became more strident, pessimistic and at times aggressive. Part of this change 
manifested itself in a "revival in historical interest in France's national past" that sought 
to "stimulate a rebirth of national sentiment and self-confidence."73 Thus, this discussion 
will now turn to Renan's view of the nation as it related to the articulation of the nation-
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Chapter Five: Treitschke, Renan and European Historiography 
The preceding chapters have analyzed Treitschke's and Renan's conceptions of the 
nation-state as they were first put forth in their primary texts as well as their relationship 
to the events of the Franco-Prussian war and Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. 
The final context in which Treitschke's and Renan's views on the nation-state will be 
considered is their relationship to the national tradition of historiography, which 
constituted the dominant mode of historical practice during the period in which both 
Treitschke and Renan produced their opposing conceptions. Like many of the early 
exponents of theories on nationalism, there exists an intimate relationship between their 
views and the broader historiographical trends at the time.1 
The national tradition of historical writing was the product of two interconnected 
processes that came to define nineteenth century historiography. The first was the 
centrality of questions of national identity that accompanied those tumultuous events of 
the nineteenth century that changed the face of the European geo-political landscape. 
Until 1815 the Napoleonic Wars had disrupted much of the continent and in 1848 
revolutions swept across many of its countries. Out of this restructuring of the European 
order came the rise to prominence of the nation-state in the founding of new 'national' 
states such as Greece in 1830, Belgium in 1831, Italy in 1861, Germany in 1871 and 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro in 1878. The appearance of these new states only 
heightened the need for the newly emerging, as well as the older established, European 
nation-states to articulate their sense of national identity. 
Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory, 19. 
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At this same time, the nineteenth century, Stefan Berger notes, "witnessed the 
increasing professionalisation of historical writing and the rigorous application of 
methodological ground rules."3 It evolved first in the German university system and was 
soon adopted in France, Italy and Britain at some point during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. What followed was the establishment of the first university chairs in 
history, the creation of historical societies, which collected and published historical 
documents, and the founding of historians' own professional journals.4 The result of this 
professionalisation in historical studies, Berger states, was that it provided a "basis for a 
self-confident and exclusive self-understanding of the historical profession which now 
began to distinguish between 'professional historians' and 'dilettantes'."5 More emphasis 
was placed upon the scientific approach of historical investigation especially as it related 
to the 'objective' use of archival source material. Yet, the adoption of these 
"methodological ground rules," Berger states, was not "particularly successful in 
preventing the continued legitimatory use of historical writings."6 On the contrary, these 
newly institutionalized bodies of European historians adopted partisan attitudes to both 
their historical investigations and the contemporary political battles of their time, while 
simultaneously "insisting their politics had no influence on their scholarliness and in 
particular on their objectivity as scholars."7 Thus, in this highly politicized atmosphere, 
nineteenth century academic historians increasingly took on the role of "national 
3 
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pedagogues"8 whose function was to articulate a sense of national identity of their 
respective countries. Through their research they aimed at "discovering (or inventing) 
the distant origins and ancient glories of their people."9 To do so, national historians 
turned to the history, language, folklore, territory, culture or religion of their respective 
nation-states, to demonstrate the past traditions of their nation as "symbolic evidence of 
its historic continuity and hence its authenticity."10 Thus, in the national tradition the 
historian functioned as "nation-builder" by writing multi-volume works to narrate the 
history of his particular nation.11 Furthermore, as Berger points out, 
the institutionalization of professional history-writing and its close links 
with the task of nation-building led to relatively high levels of conformity 
among professional historians. The state, which wielded considerable 
powers over the appointment and promotion of'professional' historians at 
the universities and research institutes, often had a clear idea of which 
histories and historians it wanted to promote.12 
Thus, national histories were written to sustain and develop national identities and 
bolster allegiances to the respective nation-state that was being chronicled. They formed, 
writes Stuart Woolf, "part of the process of deliberate 'nation-building,' which spread 
through Europe in the later part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the political 
elites sought to strengthen the ties to their people to the old and newly formed nation 
g 
Stefan Berger, The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in German 
Since 1800, (Providence: Berghan Books, 1997), 9. 
9 Woolf, ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present, 2. 
!i I b i d -
Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory, 20. 
12 
It is important to add that, as Berger notes, diroughout Western Europe, "the degrees of conformity 
encouraged by such state intervention differed quite substantially." The strongest example was nineteenth 
century Germany where a small group of professors controlled the cursus honorum leading to academic 
titles and careers. Whereas in France and Britain, "academic historians were able to move in and out of the 
historical profession much more freely than in Germany, where a greater degree of professionalisation also 
meant once a historian always a historian." Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, "Apologias 
for the nation-state in Western Europe since 1800," 8. 
99 
states." Consequently, national histories were characterized by a general lack of 
analytical distance between the historian and his subject nation resulting in written 
histories largely devoid of impartiality. Rather, the intent of historians in the national 
tradition was to demonstrate the uniqueness of their particular nation-state.14 To do so, 
nationalist historians increasingly essentialized the alleged national characteristics of 
their respective country. Consequently, "identifiably divergent traditions of 
conceptualizing nations and nationalism can be unearthed from within the varied national 
histories written across Europe in the nineteenth century."15 Whereas much of British 
historiography of the period was concerned with "demonstrating the civilisatory progress 
achieved by Britain through its championing of liberty and constitutional values, and 
through its long and continuous parliamentary tradition," French historians came to 
perceive their nation as the champion of their revolutionary slogan of "liberie, egalite, 
fraterniteT^ In the French national tradition, the slogan of the French revolution of 1789 
came to symbolize "that it was in France that the Third Estate had for the first time, truly 
become a nation."17 Whereas the Germans saw their national character in what they 
believed to be the superiority of German culture and scholarship in particular, the Italian 
nationalist discourse celebrated the country's ancient culture and traditions. Thus, in 
their efforts to demonstrate the uniqueness of their respective countries, each of these 
nationalist discourses proposed that their nations followed "special paths" thereby 
attributing to them eternal characteristics. To demonstrate this point, nationalist 
Woolf, ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present, 3. 
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historians, Berger writes, "constructed national teleologies designed to legitimate the 
present and prevent future change. They read national histories backward to arrive at 
foundational dates for their respective national histories."18 For example, Whig 
historians in Britain, such as Thomas Babington Macauley, provided their nation with its 
powerful myth of evolutionary progress-founded on its tradition of liberal 
parliamentarianism-by tracing the British constitution as it had evolved throughout the 
ages. Thus, the foundational dates in Whig historiography were 1215 with the signing of 
the Magna Carta and the revolution of 1688, which were seen as having initiated the 
British parliamentary tradition.19 By stressing the singular significance of the 'Great 
Revolution' the foundational date for French nationalist historiography became 1789. On 
the other hand, German historians championed the concepts of ethnicity and cultural 
identity as constituting the core of the "national spirit." It was argued that the German 
cultural identity had long been established throughout German territories and that 
political unity would be the natural result of this cultural identity.20 German nationalist 
historians sought to demonstrate, that "it was not politics which brought true liberation to 
the individual self, but rather, that the powerful state was to protect the innermost search 
of the individual for true fulfillment of his (rarely her) potential."21 When German unity 
was fulfilled, 1871 became the foundational date for German nationalist historiography as 
the Reich took on an increasingly large role in the self-definition of the German nation-
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state. Thus, for each variety of national history, these foundational dates in-turn became 
connected to the creation of foundational myths.22 The result, Woolf states, was that, 
by the 1840's [and] almost uninterruptedly from the later nineteenth 
century until the second world war, such historians interpreted the history 
of their country in a teleological manner, as culminating inevitably in the 
nation state, whether monarchical or republican. The destiny of the nation 
not only explained its past, but often justified the state's imperialist 
ambitions . . . The assumption that a 'national spirit' could be followed 
like a red thread through the centuries, laid down with academic authority 
to a lay audience . . . became through endless simplification and repetition 
in school and family, uncritical dogma. Historians thus contributed, at 
best, to the pride and collective ideals intrinsic to a sense of national 
sentiment; but also, at worst to the aggressive political projects of the 
extreme right. . . .2 3 
While the national histories written in the second half of the nineteenth century 
are most commonly associated with their role in instilling nationalist sentiment they also 
reveal an articulation of the nation-state as the logical consequence of historical progress. 
Each of the divergent traditions was guided by the historian's belief in the 'naturalness' 
and inevitability of the nation-state.24 As Lambert describes it, "the historians awareness 
of what Milan Kundera has termed the 'unobviousness' of nations was pivotal to their 
approach to writing national histories."25 For the practitioners of nationalist 
historiography, the "very triumph of the nation-state" was seen as a confirmation of their 
teleological reading of history.26 Consequently, despite the particular qualities proposed 
to render each nation unique from one-another, all nationalist historians, generally 
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assumed without question that humanity is divided into distinct enclaves called 'nations', 
and that these nations had a unique right to sovereignty and political representation.27 
As stated earlier, Treitschke's and Renan's views on the nation-state are 
inextricably tied to the national traditions of their respective countries. The articulation 
of the nation-state, as put forth in the nationalist German and French historiographical 
discourse, served as both the philosophical and professional context in which both men 
produced their theories. As such both Treitschke's and Renan's definitions of the nation-
state do correspond to specific visions of the nation as articulated by their respective 
national historiographies. Whereas the French emphasized the political construction of 
the nation, the German view of the nation-state was characterized by its emphasis on 
history, culture and ethnicity. 
Regarding Treitschke's place within the German national tradition, he, more than 
most historians of his time, came to epitomize the role of "nationalist pedagogue" of 
German academia. As Berger states, "Nationalist historiography was to find its climax in 
the Berlin historian Heinrich von Treitschke."28 His appointment in April 1874 to the 
University of Berlin, the venue of his "Politics" lectures and from which he would wield 
his greatest influence, was awarded not on the basis of his scholarship but for his ability 
to "encourage his students to develop a national identity."29 As discussed previously, his 
Berlin seminars were widely attended by the future elites of Wilhelmine Germany, and 
were highly influential.30 In his unfinished five-volume magnum opus History of 
Germany in the Nineteenth Century, Treitschke presents Germany's national history as 
27 
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being made by a series of "gigantic Hohenzollern heroes" thus legitimating the powerful 
legend of Prussia's German vocation. In the dedication to this work, Treitschke makes 
no apology as to the work's intended function, stating that it was written to awaken the 
reader to "the joy of having a fatherland"32 thus arousing within the German people, "that 
unanimous sense of joyous gratitude which older nations feel towards their political 
heroes."33 
As to Treitschke's place within the pantheon of German nationalist historians of 
the nineteenth century, he straddled two schools, drawing from and contributing to both. 
The first was the so-called Prussian school, which from the first half of the nineteenth 
century, had, in Berger's words, "turned politics into metaphysics" by "judging every 
political event according to what was allegedly historically necessary, i.e., the building of 
a German nation by Prussia."34 Members of the Prussian school included its founder 
Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), Frederich Christoph Dahlmann (1785-1860), and 
Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895).35 Treitschke's faith in Prussia's destined vocation as 
the unifier of a German state can be traced back to his student days at the University of 
Bonn in 1851, where he attended lectures by staunch nationalists such as Ernst Moritz 
Arndt and Dahlmann, the latter of whom had an immense influence upon Treitschke.36 
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Treitschke's faith in Prussia's vocation for the establishment of a German nation-state 
was a recurring theme in his writings during the days of the Franco-Prussian war and his 
calls for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.37 Following unification, Treitschke 
continued to place Prussia at the centre of German national life arguing that out of all the 
states of the German Empire, Prussia was the only one that had retained its sovereignty as 
T O 
a result of its military and political dominance over the other German states. 
The second group with which Treitschke is associated is the neo-Rankean school, 
which some argue replaced the Prussian school during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.39 Following in the tradition of their namesake, the neo-Rankeans prided 
themselves on stressing the objectivity of historical study more than the Prussians, yet 
much like the Prussians the function of history in their view remained the preservation of 
the idea of nationality. Treitschke's connection to this group was not so much to its 
methodological orientation, but to the views espoused by its more right wing members, 
such as Georg von Below, Karl Lamprecht, Otto Hoetzsch and Dietrich Schafer who 
together came to be regarded as the Pan-German historians. These historians both 
supported and called for an escalation in Germany's imperialist ventures as well as the 
language as signs of the German peoples inherent superiority. Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: The 
Education of a Nation, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 75-80. Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann (1785-
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continuation of its monarchic government and the increasing growth of its civil service 
and army. The Pan-Germans are generally characterized by their social-Darwinist 
perspective, which expressed itself through various "diffusions of organic imagery" thus 
contributing to "the aggressive nationalist Zeitgeist so characteristic of the Wilhelmine 
period of Germany history."40 
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century the national tradition had become the 
dominant discourse in German historiography.41 Philosophically, it was guided by what 
is generally referred to as historicism. As it concerns Treitschke, the view of the nation-
state as seen through the lens of German historicism served as the philosophical 
foundation that most greatly informed his views on the state and nationalism. While 
many of the national traditions in Europe during this period were influenced by the 
historicist approach, it received "its most radical expression" in Germany.42 As Isaiah 
Berlin contends, historicism "first found systematic expression among German thinkers" 
where it soon "acquired the status of an almost official philosophy of history." 
Moreover, historicism, as the philosophical foundation for the German national tradition, 
was since its inception "historically connected with the rise of the national German 
state."44 
The essence of the historicist stance was that "there is a fundamental difference 
between the phenomena of nature and those of history."45 Whereas nature, in the 
historicist's view, is "the scene of the eternally recurring, of phenomena themselves 
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devoid of conscious purpose," history "comprises unique and unduplicable human acts, 
filled with volition and intent."46 For the historicists, states Iggers, "The world of man is 
in a state of incessant flux, although within it there are centers of stability (personalities, 
institutions, nations, epochs), each possessing an inner structure, a character, and each in 
constant metamorphosis in accord with its own internal principles of development."47 
Thus, historicism operates from the assumption that there "is no constant in human 
nature."48 Rather, a person's or people's character reveals itself only according to one's 
particular development. As a result historicism insists that history is the only guide to 
understanding things human as the "abstract, classificatory methods of the natural 
sciences are . . . inadequate models for the study of the human world."49 For the 
historicists, the human world, Berlin explains, "could be felt, or intuited, or understood 
by a species of direct acquaintance" but "it could not be taken to pieces and reassembled 
even in thought, like a mechanism compounded of isolable parts, obedient to universal 
and unfaltering causal laws."50 Thus, historicism represents a tradition of historical 
thought which rejected the Enlightenment doctrine of natural law. Whereas natural law 
theory conceived of the universe in terms of timeless and absolute truths, which 
correspond to a rational order, historicism replaced this belief with an understanding of 
the fullness and diversity of man's historical experience.51 
The early Romantics were the first to articulate the historicist view of the nation-












the nation.52 This organic view of the nation-state is based upon the historicist 
conception "of all human activities as elements in unified 'organic' social wholes, not 
static institutional structures, but dynamic processes of development — " 5 3 As part of 
this process, nations and cultures were viewed as "social 'organisms' held together by 
impalpable and complex relationships which characterized living social wholes."54 Thus, 
nation-states, in the historicist vision, constituted "quasi-biological entities which defied 
analysis by the exact quantitative analysis" of the natural sciences. 5 
Johann Gottfried Herder was the first to propose an organic view of the nation 
insisting that "within the flux of history" nations represent centers of relative stability.56 
Nations, in Herder's view, "possess a morphology; they are alive they grow."57 As such, 
nations, Herder contends, have "the characteristics of persons: they have a spirit and they 
have a lifespan. They are not a collection of individuals, but are organisms."58 Thus, for 
Herder, nations were pre-political entities whose roots lie in the culture, language and 
ethnicity of their component population.59 Herder proposed that these roots form the 
basis of national identity, which in the German case manifested itself within the Volk 
(people) who formed a Blutsgemeinschaft (community of blood), and which harbored a 
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Volksseele (national soul) and Volksgeist (national spirit).60 Thus, in Herder's view, 
nationalism had little to do with the state, politics or citizenship but rather resided in what 
he saw as the individuality of each nation. Herder proposed a concept of individuality, 
which essentially transferred the individuality normally accorded to the individual to the 
national community, thus rendering the nation as unique and self-contained.61 This view 
Of the German nation and nationality as organic entities that form "a specific historical 
individuality," had enormous influence upon subsequent generations of historians as it 
contained "certain implications for political theory."62 As Iggers writes, Herder's 
concept of individuality "assumes that there are no universally valid values, that ethics 
cannot be based upon precepts of reason or upon the assumption of a common human 
nature. Rather, all values come out of the spirit of nations."63 While Herder's influence 
upon future German historians of the national tradition is undeniable, his ideas, Berger 
points out, were developed within the context of an enlightened cosmopolitanism and as 
such "cannot be viewed un-problematically as a direct precursor of nineteenth-century 
German nationalism."64 Rather, the influence of Herder's idea of the nation, within the 
"diverse codifications of nationalism formulated in the nineteenth century," was that it 
served as a philosophical platform on which German nationalist intellectuals could base 
their views. For example, J.G. Fichte's Address to the German nation (1806) took 
Herder's ideas one step further by "putting the German collective identity above anyone 
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else's." Fichte argued that the German nation was the original nation as distinguished 
by the genius of the German language, which he regarded as the original language of 
mankind, the Ursprache. As representative of a particularly unique and original nation, 
Germany had to guard against being contaminated by other nations as its salvation 
depended on the preservation of its culture and language.66 The influence of Herder and 
Fichte's work upon the German national tradition was that it outlined an organic theory 
of the nation which nineteenth-century German nationalist historians interpreted as a 
"justification for a xenophobic idea of a national collectivity based on the Volk."67 By 
the mid-nineteenth century this organic view of the German nation, as defined by its 
Volk, had become commonplace amongst German historians.68 Thus, with regards to 
Treitschke many of his views are representative of the commonly held beliefs at the time. 
Treitschke's view of the nation-state, as outlined in previous chapters, is 
essentially in line with historicist assumptions. His belief that nation-states are 
primordial, that they exist as individual personalities and that "common-blood" serves as 
the strongest indicator of nationality are all historicist in character and generally speaking 
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conform to the organic definition of the nation. Moreover, the Volkish rationale he 
employed to demand the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is also indicative of historicist 
thought as it was interpreted by much of the nineteenth century German historical 
establishment. As Dorpalen points out, Treitschke's intellectual orientation as a whole 
was guided by his rejection of natural law theory, which he saw as "artificial and 
mendacious."70 By revolting against the "central classical and Christian concept of a 
world governed by a single, static natural law" Treitschke was able to rationalize his 
claim that humanity is fundamentally unequal.71 Indeed, "his entire philosophy," states 
Dorpalen, "bears the imprint of this repudiation of all values above and beyond the state 
and led him increasingly to distrust and deprecate everything non-German." While the 
fundamentals of Treitschke's thought are rooted in eighteenth century historicist 
assumptions concerning the German nation, his state-centered perspective, and his belief 
that the will of the state supercedes that of the individual, was characteristic of the 
historical discourse of the second half of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the rise 
to prominence of the Prussian school which increasingly came to identify the German 
state's importance to the German nation. 
Despite labeling Treitschke's view of the nation-state as organicist in Politics Treitschke states that he is 
opposed to terming the state as an "organism." Rather, as discussed in chapter one, he preferred to label 
the state as a "great collective personality." Treitschke understood that to regard the state as an organism in 
earlier times "had a certain justification" in order to discredit "the mechanical view" of the state and that its 
use was necessary to "emphasize the doctrine that the State develops naturally, as an automatic product of 
the people's will." Still he preferred to treat the state as a person as this implied it had a conscious will, 
which was the essence of the state, whereas there "are countless organisms without conscious will." 
Furthermore, he saw the term organism as itself problematic, as "the boundary between organic and 
inorganic life has begun to fluctuate" thereby rendering the term indefinable. Treitschke, Politics, 12. 
Treitschke's opposition to describing the state as an organism does not negate the fact that his views on the 
nation-state conform to an organicist definition of the nation-state and nationality as understood in 
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Early exponents of the organic view of the nation, such as Herder and Fichte, 
were initially suspicious of the role of state. In 1784, Herder wrote that it is 
"inconceivable that man is made for the state."73 For Herder, the state was an artificial 
institution, which was detrimental to human happiness. Similarly Fichte, in 1784, wrote 
that the "aim of all government is to make government superfluous."74 Yet, towards the 
close of the eighteenth up to the mid-nineteenth century, historicism underwent a shift of 
direction with regard to its perception of the role of the state, as the concept of the state in 
the nation and in society increasingly occupied a more central position.75 Thus, by the 
early nineteenth century, "an aesthetic culturally oriented approach to nationality 
increasingly gave place to the ideal of the national state."76 The state began to be viewed 
in power-political terms in which it was assumed that, in pursuing its own power-political 
interests, states act in accord with a higher morality.77 For many German historians 
Prussia became the focus of this new perspective as the political interests of the more 
often than not organic conception of the German nation "were increasingly identified 
with the power-political interests of the Prussian state."78 
As discussed previously the practice of history, as undertaken by the Prussian 
school, was oriented towards the aim of facilitating the creation of a Prussian-led German 
nation-state. To achieve this outcome, Prussian historians such as Treitschke, Droysen 
and Sybel came to view the role of the state and its relationship to the individual in 
history in new ways. The subjugation of the individual to the will of the state, a 
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recurring motif in Treitschke's work, was an inherent component within this mentality as 
it was believed that the power of the state was the most significant measure of a society's 
health and success. 
The Prussian historians believed that history led to a society wherein the 
individual would be freer and happier. Unlike western liberalism, which conceived of 
the state as an instrument for the achievement of the welfare of the individual, the 
Prussian historians rejected the doctrine of the primacy of the individual and replaced it 
with the primacy of historical forces.80 For the Prussian school, the state was not only a 
natural product of historical forces but also a positive good. In their view the state 
represented an "ethical value without which culture and morality were impossible." 
Consequently, the Prussian historians identified the state with power. In their conception, 
the state's power did not represent mere force, but was rather viewed as an "instrument to 
further the ethical aims of the state."82 
Droysen's conception of history and the relationship between the individual, the 
nation, and the state, is an instructive example as his conclusions strongly resemble many 
of Treitschke's points and are in general more comprehensible. Much like Treitschke, 
Droysen's basic political conviction was the primacy of the state over individual 
interests. Droysen conceived of society as composed of groupings of communities. 
These were natural communities (i.e., family, community, nation-the Volk), communities 
of ideals (i.e., language, the arts and sciences, religion) and practical communities (i.e., 
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institutions of social control that maintained the harmony between competing interests). 
Droysen distinguished four practical communities: the spheres of society, the economy, 
law and power (the state).84 In this rendering of society, Iggers writes, "the individual is 
ethical to the extent that he identifies himself with the community. For this reason, there 
is no morality apart from society and no universal ethical principles."85 Much like 
Treitschke's assertion in Politics "that the state does not stand for the whole life of the 
nation," Droysen does not identify the ethical idea with the state alone, maintaining that 
the individual can belong to other ethical communities as well.86 Rather, the state's role 
is that it enables these ethical forces to function and develop. Thus, for Droysen the 
relationship between the state's power and the ethical communities is reciprocal, as the 
communities depend on the state for their protection and freedom and the state depends 
on the wellbeing of these communities for its strength. Describing this relationship, 
Droysen states, 
The state as a public force guarantees the security of all the ethical spheres 
within the state. These spheres sacrifice as much of their autonomy and 
self-determination as is necessary for the power (state) to be able to defend 
and represent them . . . [The state's] power is greatest when the health, 
liberty, and movement of all ethical spheres is most fully developed.87 
Therefore, Droysen reasons that because the state rests upon the great ethical 
communities, the interests of the state are identical with the demands of ethics. Thus, for 
society to function effectively the state had to be based upon power as it represented the 
only force in a position to act as an impersonal and impartial arbiter between the various 
Ibid, 113. 
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spheres.88 Therefore, individual interests, as represented by the ethical spheres, are 
required to submit to the power of the state in order to maintain themselves, thereby 
ensuring the continuance of the state's power. 
Based on these assumptions Droysen rejects the notion of a government based 
upon popular sovereignty and bound by written guarantees of individual rights.89 
Rather, Droysen believes that government, by acting in the interests of the state, is the 
best guarantee of individual rights, as it furthered the aims of the ethical community. In 
this dynamic popular participation in government was immaterial.90 
Like Droysen, Sybel sees the state as a moral institution and thus saw individual 
interests as necessarily beneath those of the state. Sybel's position is based upon his 
conception of freedom, which for him did not represent "mere freedom of constraint" or 
what he describes as a "formal self-determination of the will without regard to the content 
of the will."91 Rather, Sybel views freedom as the "self-determination to attain culture 
and morality," which is part of the process of the "unfettered development of human 
nature."92 For Sybel, freedom was only possible within a community and under the 
guidance of the state as a moral institution. Thus, Sybel concludes "the state has power 
over the individuals, [and] that the latter owe obedience to the state and can achieve their 
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own freedom only through this obedience." Thus, Sybel contends that the state is "the 
realization of freedom through the power of the community" and that its task is 
"synonymous with the perfection of human culture."94 
The significance of Droysen's and Sybel's views as they relate to Treitschke's 
conception of the state, lie in their identification of the state as power. Unlike Droysen 
and Sybel, Treitschke comes to identify the state as power, not by its ability to further its 
ethical aim-though he does identify the state as a moral community-but through its 
ability to assert its will in its main functions as a legal and military power.95 For 
Treitschke, the nation-state was power because it could assert itself against other nation-
states as well as administer justice, not because it necessarily guaranteed the ethical life 
of its people. Thus, Treitschke holds a more naturalistic view of the state's power 
compared to Droysen's and Sybel's view of power as an ethical force. Yet, Treitschke, 
Droysen and Sybel are in agreement as to the singular importance of the state as the 
power that rules over the conflicting interests of society. Moreover, all three believe that 
for society to function effectively, the individual must submit to the will of the state in 
order to ensure the continuance of its power. Bernhard Giesen explains the Prussian 
historians' concern with power as a form of Realpolitik doctrine.96 This characterization 
is particularly fitting with regard to Treitschke who described his first experience of 
reading Roachau's Foundations of Realpolitik as akin to being struck by lightning, and he 
included it among the works which exerted the strongest influence upon his thinking.97 
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Indeed, for Treitschke and his fellow Prussian historians, society, Giesen points out, was 
guided by "the law of the stronger" which was seen to exercise "a similar rule over state 
life as the law of gravity on the world of bodies."98 Thus, Droysen, Sybel and Treitschke 
all came to view the German nation-state as an "autonomous power concern" meaning 
that the sovereign state was based on a simple reality, its own power, thus, the sphere of 
state action became autonomous." In this conception, the state, Giesen writes: 
decouples itself from cultural foundations, and appears as a system that 
only relates to itself and its own dynamics of growth. The measure of the 
state's exercise of power is ultimately only that of its long-term political 
success, i.e. the growth of that power itself. Political action loses 
superordinate values or goals, and is oriented only by its own measure: it 
becomes pure will, which increases itself as the will to be able to will ever 
more, in short: as the will to power.100 
Treitschke embraced this notion in his articulation of the nation-state as outlined in 
Politics. Indeed, Treitschke contends that the very genesis of a state occurs whenever a 
group or individual "has achieved sovereignty by imposing its will upon the whole body" 
of a community.101 For Treitschke, the state's will to power represented the essence of 
the state and his primary concern was the continuance of the state's ability to assert its 
will thereby allowing it to fulfill its primary functions as society's legal and military 
authority.102 His demand that citizens submit to the state is based on his belief that the 
individual's acquiescence is required by the state to accomplish its will, which he argued 
Realpolitik. Rochau argued, "It is actually unreasonable to subordinate might to right. Only the stronger 
has and should have power." 
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was ultimately beneficial for the individual.103 As outlined above, this perspective was 
shared by the Prussian historians in general and reveals a conception of the nation-state 
that lacked any reference to the process of forming a democratic will.104 For the Prussian 
historians "binding the state to the mere opinions of the majority risked the irresponsible 
rule of the mob" and thus was seen as a challenge to the state's will to power.105 As 
Giesen explains it, "The pure will to power in this way finds its expression in a nation-
state purified of all reference to concrete individuals and concrete majorities. The 
diversity and mutability of majorities weakens the development of state power; the state 
must therefore be freed from these limitations upon its potentials."106 By envisioning the 
nation as the dynamic foundation of the state, the Prussian historians were able to 
reconcile the suppression of individual freedom to the state's will to power. For the 
Prussian historians, Giesen explains, the citizen's sense of belonging to the same nation 
[rendered the] various and contradictory to appear unified and cohesive, 
without, requiring that the freedom of the citizens is suppressed in the 
process. As distinct from despotic rule, in which the will of the despot 
forces together the variety of citizens from the outside, the nation-state 
commands a foundation of integration and unity without force, shifted 
onto the individual citizen in agreement with his freedom.107 
Treitschke's comments in Politics on the importance of the individual's sense of national 
belonging, which he referred to as "patriotism" or "national honor," exemplifies this 
position as he saw a citizen's sense of national identity as an integral component to the 
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individuals' sense of belonging to the same nation facilitated the bringing together of a 
people in a non-violent fashion thereby increasing the power of the state in absolute 
comparison to other states.109 In Treitschke's case this conception of the nation-state 
ultimately revealed itself in his Pan-Germanism, his calls for German imperial expansion, 
and his glorification of war. As Giesen states, 
If there is no true unity conceivable above and beyond the state, nothing 
higher that could gain and increase power for itself, then the relations 
between states become the ultimate field for the exercise of power, and all 
else, especially the domestic relations of a society must be subordinated to 
foreign policy.. . this primacy of foreign policy is absolute, and narrowly 
associated with the glorification of war as the act of power that cannot be 
surpassed . . . Violence and power are removed from domestic social 
relations, and shifted beyond the borders, to relations between states: 
society as a sphere of the regulated free self-determination of individuals, 
international anarchy as the realm of pure violence and will to power.110 
As this chapter has demonstrated, Treitschke's view of the nation-state is 
representative of concepts and assumptions that existed as part of a larger 
historiographical discourse begun by the German romantic philosophers in the eighteenth 
century and continued by the German nationalist historians of the nineteenth century. 
Scholars have described this discourse as representative of a broader German "conception 
of History," an "ideology," a "philosophy of history" or a "mentality."111 Whatever 
label one applies to it, its chief concern, as Lambert puts it, "was the question of how, 
exactly, the historical imagination should construct 'Germany'."112 This process of 
imagining often envisioned the German nation-state as representing a contrast to the 
Giesen, Intellectuals and the Nation, 136. 
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western European conception of a political nation-state with its emphasis on civil society, 
natural rights and social contracts.113 More specifically, the German vision of the nation-
state, with its concern with the power of the state stood in stark contrast to the French 
nationalist discourse and its emphasis on its revolutionary heritage and the "role of the 
people" as the basis for claims of French "exceptionalism."114 Thus, the discussion will 
now turn to the view of the nation-state as it was articulated in the French nationalist 
discourse and its relationship to Renan's view of the nation. 
Renan's relationship to the view of the nation as it was articulated within the 
French national tradition differs from Treitschke's in several respects. Unlike Treitschke, 
Renan was not a nationalist historian. He never wrote a multi-volume history of France 
and his legacy is not that of a "nation-builder" of the French national tradition. In 
nineteenth-century French historiography this title is reserved for the likes of Jules 
Michelet (1798-1874) and Ernest Lavisse (1842-1922) amongst others.115 Yet, themes in 
Renan's work on nationality are representative of the view of the nation as it was 
Ibid, 98. The issue of German intellectuals' rejection of western concepts or norms is part of a broader 
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proposed in the French national tradition, which was fashioned according to the so-called 
universal values of the French Revolution.116 
In the nineteenth-century the French Revolution and the traditions associated with 
it functioned as the determining element in the construction of the French national 
identity.117 This was a period in which the heritage of the French Revolution was "slowly 
lift 
and painfully absorbed, expressed and domesticated" in French society. Part of this 
process was facilitated by the work of French nationalist historians such as Michelet and 
Lavisse. Through their references to France's revolutionary past these historians created 
a dynamic in which, "the social order of the modern nation-state, rooted in the 
secularized traditions of the Republic, could be legitimized in a collective identity whose 
consciousness was based on a teleological view of the nation as pedagogical authority in 
the representation of its values."119 
Thus, for historians such as Michelet and Lavisse, history was a "patriotic 
mission" whose intended function was the strengthening of the French national 
consciousness.120 Whereas Michelet's approach was representative of French 
historiography's romantic period, with its use of memoirs, narration and its celebration of 
revolutionary values, Lavisse's approach was positivist in orientation as it sought to test 
the entire national tradition against documents in the archives.121 
Renan's ties to the French national tradition are located in the voluntarist aspects 
of his view of the nation, which has often been treated as indicative of a particularly 
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French style of nationalism that saw France as the ideal nation based upon the voluntary 
participation of its members. Indeed, as Smith demonstrates, the very roots of the 
voluntartist conception of the nation-of which Renan is arguably a leading progenitor-lie 
in an intellectual tradition started by Rousseau, and continued by the likes of Michelet 
and Lavisse, that saw the French nation-state as a contractual or voluntary association 
dedicated to liberty and justice.122 For instance, Rousseau's belief that sovereignty within 
a nation was based upon all individuals uniting in a compact and expressing their will in 
the "general will"123 is certainly present in Renan's identification of a nation as "spiritual 
principle," which exists as a "large-scale solidarity" and expresses itself in day to day life 
as the "clearly expressed desire to live a common life."124 Yet, whereas Rousseau saw 
the lifeblood of the nation in the patriotism of its members, Renan identifies the nation's 
spirit in the people's sense of shared history. 
Analogous themes between Renan's thought and French nationalist 
historiography can also be discerned in the work of Michelet whose goal was to 
"integrate all the material and spiritual facts in an organic whole, a living entity" thus 
presenting France "as a soul and a person."125 For example, Renan, in reference to the 
French Revolution, noted that it was France's "glory for having, through the French 
Revolution, proclaimed that a nation exists of itself and asserted that "we should not be 
Smith, The Nation in History, 7-9. 
123 
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displeased if others imitate us in this. It was we who founded the principle of 
nationality."126 These ideas were first formulated by Michelet in his monumental History 
of France, which portrayed the French revolution as the moment when nations, and 
France in particular, came into the final stage of self-consciousness. Moreover, 
similarities between Michelet and Renan can be discerned by the central role both accord 
the people as the basis of nationality. By making the people the incarnation of nationality 
Michelet concluded that legitimacy and the right to act lay with the people rather than the 
state.128 Similar themes exist in Lavisse's work, which also stressed the role of the 
French people as the foundation of the nation though under the guise of the notion of the 
patrie, or homeland, which he identified with the republic.129 Like Michelet and Lavisse, 
Renan emphasizes the notion of the people as the embodiment of nationality. 
Throughout his discussion on nationality, in both the period of the Franco-Prussian war 
and later in What is a nation?, Renan repeatedly refers to the will or desires of a people 
as the decisive determinant of nationality. For example, in What is a nation? Renan 
states: 
A nation has no more right than a king does to say to a province: 'You 
belong to me, I am seizing you.' A province, as far as I am concerned, is 
its inhabitants; if anyone has the right to be consulted in such an affair, it 
is the inhabitant. A nation never has any real interest in annexing or 
holding on to a country against its will. The wish of nations is, all in all, 
the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return. 
Renan, "What is a nation?," 12. Lawrence makes a similar point in, Nationalism: History and Theory, 
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Thus, by equating the desires of the people with the will of the nation, Renan reveals that 
his view of nationality is oriented by a fundamental recognition that nationality is bound 
to the perception a people have of themselves as a nationality and not according to some 
subjective criterion such as race or language. This does not imply that people can 
necessarily choose their nationality, as this is constituted by past political developments 
and manifested in a shared sense of identity, but that one nationality cannot claim another 
as its own if the latter do not consider themselves as members of that nationality. 
Thus, elements of Renan's discussion on nationality are characteristic of the view 
of the French nation as it was put forth by the French national historians of his lifetime. 
Yet, unlike Michelet or Lavisse, Renan's discussion on nationality is largely devoid of 
the hyper-nationalism that was so prominent a feature within their work and nineteenth-
century French national historiography in general. Renan's writing displays neither 
Michelet's religious conception of patriotism131 nor Lavisse's emphasis on the necessity 
of patriotic duty. While Renan often evokes a concern for France and its well-being, 
his discussion on the nation and nationality is not reflective of a tradition that sought to 
embolden the French national consciousness, despite the fact that he at times extolled the 
virtues of patriotism and its importance to the health of French society.133 Thus, while 
Renan's views on nationality are, as Lawrence states, "rooted in a deep-seated love of 
France as a bastion of liberty and a storehouse for 'universal values,'" his discussion on 
On Michelet see Kohn, Prophets and Peoples, 43-77. 
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nationality was not oriented towards the promotion of these values. m Chadbourne 
explains Renan's position as of one who "believed in the nation but not in 
nationalism."135 In Renan's view, Chadbourne writes: "True patriotism, as [Renan] 
himself exemplified it, is the courage to declare one's nation mistaken when one believes 
that to be the truth. Pesudo-patriotism is to the nation what vanity is to the individual." 
Indeed, Renan's writings on nationality are often marked by a general wariness towards 
the subject of nationalism. Renan feared that the exclusive concern with nationality 
would plunge the world into wars of extermination. His fundamental message was that 
nations and nationality should be viewed according to the precepts of reason and as part 
of a greater collective humanity.137 "Human culture," he contends, antedates and is 
greater than national cultures.138 While he considered nations as just and legitimate for 
nineteenth century European life, he reminds his listeners that nations and their 
concomitant nationalisms represent a temporary state of affairs and will probably be 
replaced by some form of "European federation."139 Thus, while Renan's antipathy was 
most strongly directed towards the German organicist conception of the nation, his 
emphasis on humanity demonstrates a more general concern with nationalism in all its 
134 
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forms. For, Renan, Chadbourne correctly observes, the highest "ideal reality was not 
the nation but humanity.140 
Arguably, Renan's discussion on the nation and nationality is more closely tied to 
contemporary French historiography and the importance present-day French historians 
and nationalism scholars have placed upon collective memory as a source of the French 
national identity.141 As discussed in chapter two, Renan proposed the conjunction 
between collective memory and national identity, stating that a nation is based upon "a 
rich legacy of memories" and that the act of collective "forgetting" is a "crucial factor in 
the creation of a nation."142 Robert Gildea also identifies the importance of collective 
memory on national identity, arguing that French political culture has been defined above 
all by its collective memory, which he defines as "a collective construction of the past by 
a given community."143 Pierre Nora comes to similar conclusions, arguing that French 
history and to a great extent what has served as the basis of French national identity are 
its lieux de memoire (sites of memory), which he defines as "an object, a place, an ideal 
transformed by human agency or time into 'a symbolic element of the inherited 
touchstones of memory of a community'."144 Furthermore, Nora contends: 
The history of France's development as a nation, has been our most 
powerful collective tradition, our milieu de memoire par excellence ... 
France's entire historical tradition has developed as a disciplined exercise 
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of the mnemonic faculty, an instinctive delving into memory in order to 
reconstruct the past seamlessly and in its entirety. 5 
Gildea's, and even more so Nora's work, looks at how French historians sought to 
reconstruct the past into this "seamless narrative" or "usable past" to meet present day 
demands. Renan-without the same benefit of hindsight-also recognized the power of 
historical practice in the construction of national identity by contending that history, 
through its illumination of a people's violent origins, poses a threat to nationality, as it 
challenges those cherished illusions that comprise a people's national consciousness.146 
Thus, whereas contemporary historiography now identifies the practice of history in the 
nineteenth century as a variety of nationalism in and of itself, Renan, as a historian in the 
nineteenth century, saw his practice as an objective science whose function was to reveal 
the truth of the past.147 For Renan, history when practised in this way had the power to 
de-legitimize those foundational myths, which served as the basis for so much of 
European nationalist sentiment. Considering the politically charged climate of 
historiography that surrounded him, Renan's deconstruction of the nation and nationality 
is truly a testament to this belief. 
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Conclusion 
By comparatively analyzing Treitschke's and Renan's views on the nation-state 
and nationality a few basic conclusions can be drawn. First, if, as it has been assumed in 
contemporary nationalism historiography, Renan's voluntarist conception of the nation 
and nationality in What is a nation? was a direct response to Treitschke's organicist 
conception of the nation and nationality, then it is apparent that Renan partially 
misinterpreted Treitschke's thoughts on the subject as he presented them in Politics. 
Lawrence, who posited that Renan's 1882 lecture was a direct response to Treitschke, 
makes this point, stating, "while Renan was perhaps correct to insist that racial 
explanations of national identity do not stand up to scientific scrutiny, he missed the 
important point that it is often not ethnicity itself, but a belief in ethnic coherence that 
matters-an issue raised by Treitschke."1 Indeed, Treitschke's claim that a nation's 
perception of itself as an ethnically homogenous entity can be "either real or imaginary" 
demonstrates that he agreed with Renan's point that through the varied processes by 
which nation-states came into existence any semblance of ethnic coherence was lost. 
Moreover, Treitschke maintained that it is historically difficult to trace the "genealogical' 
foundations upon which nation-states were originally based.2 Yet, Treitschke still 
identified the state's origins as primordial and reflective of a process by which people 
formed themselves into distinct ethnic enclaves. For Renan, the nation, and presumably, 
the state as well, were the products of modern political history and their existence, he 
contended, could not be discerned in the pre-modern past. 
Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory, 36. Author's emphasis. 
2 See Chapter One. 
The difference between Renan's and Treitschke's conceptions of the nation-state, 
as it relates to ethnicity, is the importance each accords ethnicity as a constituent feature 
of nationality. Despite Treitschke's awareness that modern nations are not always 
representative of a uniform ethnicity, in his conception of the state and in his arguments 
for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, he repeatedly cites ethnicity as a basis of 
nationality. In his arguments to justify the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine Treitschke 
referred to the existence of "common-blood" between the Alsatians and their German 
neighbors, thereby emphasizing the link between ethnicity and nationality. Treitschke's 
claims on this point were part of his appropriation of the broader Volk concept by which 
he sought to justify the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine according to the German character 
of the Alsatians and to a lesser extent the Lorrainers. While in Politics Treitschke 
identifies nationality as representative of common-blood, the emphasis he places upon 
this point is much less so than in his writings during the period of the Franco-Prussian 
war. Treitschke's inconsistency can be understood as a result of the political intent that 
guided his work and by what he saw as the different political demands of Germany's pre-
unification and post-unification periods. In the period of the Franco-Prussian war 
Treitschke's arguments were orientated by what he perceived to be the "sacred necessity 
of these days" by which he meant the unification of the German nation-state. As a 
fervent supporter of Prussia's vocation to lead and unify Germany, Treitschke's argument 
was oriented in order to achieve this end and the appeal of the Volk concept to further 
this aim proved useful. In Politics, written following Germany's unification, Treitschke 
reoriented his thought in order to meet the demands of the Bismarckian state. In this 
context Treitschke no longer saw the need to stress the theme of common-blood but 
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rather to instill a sense of allegiance to the state as the moral, legal and military power 
that protected, organized and guaranteed the health of society. In contrast, Renan's 
discussion on nationality is devoid of the inconsistencies that plague Treitschke's 
thought. For Renan, German claims over Alsace-Lorraine according to an ethno-
linguistic view of nationality as well as arguments positing Germany's historical right to 
the provinces, initiated his discussion on nationality as he was appalled at what he saw as 
the annexation of a people against their will. For Renan the experience of the war was 
especially disheartening as he was a life-long admirer of German culture and society and 
he had always envisioned France and Germany as united together in order to safeguard 
their shared ideals which he saw as the finest of European civilization. His discontent 
with German ethnographic politics ultimately culminated in What is a nation?, which 
sought to systematically discredit the ethno-linguistic view of the nation and to propose 
that nationality is based upon shared historical memories (and the forgetting of those 
memories) as well the shared desire to live a common life. 
Perhaps the first fundamental divide that can be discerned between Treitschke's 
and Renan's writings on nationality is the question of the individual's own will or self-
identity as an indicator of national identity. The implication of Treitschke's arguments is 
that they eliminated an individual's self-identification or national consciousness as a 
determinant of their nationality. For Treitschke national identity was a permanent 
feature, a mark of nature, which could not be altered or removed and thus was not 
contingent on an individual's awareness of himself or herself as belonging, or not 
belonging, to a nationality. For instance, Treitschke's argument that the Alsatians' 
intrinsic German character rendered their protests against their annexation 
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inconsequential reveals a conception of nationality in which the Alsatians' self-
perception of themselves as French, or not German, was immaterial, because according to 
the ethno-linguistic criteria, amongst others arguments, they were German. Thus, the 
implication is that nationality is not tied to an individual's perception of himself or 
herself as a member of such and such a nationality but determined by factors that are 
independent from the individual's own national consciousness. Consequently, Treitschke 
could claim that by being annexed into Germany the Alsatians were being restored to 
their true selves, irrespective of whether they knew this or not; hence, their opinions were 
irrelevant. Moreover, as members of the future German nation-state the Alsatians were 
subject to the same "moral imperatives" and "historical laws" that Treitschke outlined in 
his conception of the state, which demanded that the state's will required the submission 
of the individual. Treitschke's dismissal of a people's opinions as an indicator of 
nationality was precisely the crux of Renan's argument against the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine and ethnographic politics in general. For Renan, the concept of nationality had 
to be based upon a person's self-identification as a member of a nationality. Renan's 
view was thus indicative of the more generally held French view of nationality, which 
emphasized 'the people's' collective will as representative of national identity. Renan 
did not posit that a people could choose their nationality but contended that nationality 
was determined by a people's perception of themselves, and not according to any other 
criteria. 
The second fundamental divide between Treitschke and Renan's conception of 
the nation-state and nationality are their views on humanity. Whereas Treitschke 
dismissed the notion of humanity, meaning viewing humankind as a united singular 
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entity, Renan viewed it as the highest ideal that humankind could aspire to. For 
Treitschke humankind was both naturally divided and unequal, and the formation of 
states was representative of this reality. Moreover, drawing from historicist thought and 
its rejection of natural law theory, Treitschke saw the nation-state as a self-contained 
personality, an individual, whose nature and values were unique and could not be 
understood in comparison to other nation-states. In the historicist conception of the 
nation-state, as it was proposed by the German Romantic philosophers and the Prussian 
historians, there were no universal values or laws applicable to humankind. A nation-
state could only be understood according to the particulars of its own development, which 
was reflective of its unique nature. Thus, in Treitschke's interpretation of historicist 
principles, the nation-state and its concomitant nationality were held to be ideals which 
were superior to the ideal of humanity as any understanding of the world according to 
principles applicable to the whole of humankind was deemed to be invalid. 
Renan's intellectual orientation was guided by the notion of humanity, which he 
believed antedated the formation of nation-states and their concomitant nationalities. 
While Renan accepted the existence of nations and saw them as necessary in his lifetime, 
he posited that they were not permanent features of human history but merely 
representative of the process by which European civilization had organized itself in the 
nineteenth century. He believed this reality would change and be replaced by a European 
Federation. While he never stated that this change would be beneficial for Europe, it 
seems likely that Renan felt that it would be, as he was an ardent promoter of 
internationalism and had called for the establishment of a European tribunal that could 
mediate national antagonisms and generally lessen the divisions between nation-states. 
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Indeed, Renan's discussion on the nation-state and nationality stemmed from his desire 
to, as he put it, "find a rational organization of mankind which would be as just as is 
humanely possible."3 Renan feared that national antagonisms, specifically those spurred 
on by ethnographic politics, would plunge the world into wars of extermination. For 
Treitschke, the very notion of a European international body which could stand above 
nation-states was contrary to the nature of States and hence nature itself.4 For Treitschke 
war could not be avoided, nor was its avoidance desirable, as international conflict was 
representative of the "beauty of History" by which states attain self-realization and 
exercise their inherent will.5 
Treitschke and Renan's conceptions of the nation-state and nationality, when 
viewed according to their presentation in their main works, their responses to the Franco-
Prussian war and the historiographical context in which they were produced, reveal that 
their debate was reflective of the underlying principles that guided each man's thought. 
For each, these principles oriented their discussion on the nation-state and nationality and 
what they saw as their place and meaning in human history. 
3 
Ernest Renan, to David Frederich Strauss, 15 September 1871, in Kohn, The Making of the Modern 
French Mind, 160. 
4 
Treitschke specifically rejects the concept of a "permanent international Arbitration court" in Politics 
according to these criteria. Treitschke, Politics, 17. 




Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. "Eight Address: What is a People in the Higher Meaning of 
the Word, and What is Love of Fatherland?" In Nationality and Nationalism, 
ed. Athena S. Leboussi and Steven Crosby, 15-26. London: LB. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd, 2004. (Part of Address to the German Nation, delivered 1806-1808). 
Herder, Johann Gottfried von Herder. "Yet Another Philosophy of History for the 
Education of Humanity In Nationality and Nationalism, ed. Athena S. 
LebOussi and Steven Crosby, 3-5. London: LB. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004. (first 
published 1774). 
Renan, Ernest. Constitutional Monarchy in France. Boston: Roberts Bros., 1871. 
. "Democracy in France." In The Making of the Modern French Mind, ed. 
Hans Kohn, 149-152. New York: Van Norstrand, 1955. 
. "La Guerre entre la France l'Allemagne." In The Making of the Modern 
French Mind, ed. Hans Kohn, 152-156. New York: Van Norstrand, 1955. 
. La Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale, ed. P.E. Charvet. New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968. 
. "The Problems of Peace." In The Making of the Modern French Mind, ed. 
Hans Kohn, 157-160. New York: Van Norstrand, 1955. 
. "What is a Nation? " In Nation and Narration, Translated by Martin Thom 
ed. Homi K. Bhabha, 8-23 . New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Treitschke, Heinrich von. Germany, France, Russia, & Islam. London: Jarrold & 
Sons; Allen & Unwin, 1915. 
. History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Selections. Translated by 
Eden and Cedar Paul, ed., Gordon A. Craig. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975 
. Politics: abridged, edited, and with an introduction by Hans Kohn: 
Translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1963. 
134 
Secondary Sources 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso, 1991. 
Berlin, Isaiah. Against the Current: Essays In the history of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy. 
London: Hogarth Press, 1979. 
. "Meinecke and Historicism." In The Power of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
. The Roots of Romanticism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999. 
Bernstein, Martha E. "Intellectual Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870: 
Ernest Renan and Emile Zola: Traitors or Patriots?" Thesis (M.A.), Concordia 
University, 1993. 
Berger, Stefan, M. Donovan, and K. Passmore. Writing National Histories: Western 
Europe since 1800. New York : Routledge, 1999. 
Berger, Stefan. The Search for Normality: National identity and Historical 
Consciousness in Germany since 1800. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997. 
Boer, Pim den. History as a Profession: The Study of History in France 1818-1914. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Brienza, Karen Russell. "Nationalism in France and Germany: An Inquiry into the 
Conflict over the region of Alsace." M.A. thesis., University of Virginia, 1991. 
Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
Chadbourne, Richard M. Ernest Renan. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc, 1968. 
Corcoran, Paul Edward. "The Political Thought of Ernest Renan." Ph. D. diss., Duke 
University, 1970. 
Charvet, P.E. Introduction to La Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale, by Ernest Renan. New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968. 
Craig, Gordon A. Germany: 1866-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
Davis, H. W. The Political Thought ofHeinrich von Treitschke. New York: Scribner, 
1915. 
Dorpalen, Andreas. Heinrich von Treitschke. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat 
Press, 1973. 
Ernest Gellner. "Do Nations Have Navels?," The Warwick Debates on Nationalism. 
Held in Coverntry, GB, 24 October 1995. In Nationality and Nationalism, ed. 
Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby, 425-436. London: LB. Tauris, 2004. 
. Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997. 
Giesen, Bernhard. Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial 
Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Gildea, Robert. The Past in French History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994. 
Guibernau, Montserrat. Nationalisms: The Nation-state and Nationalism in the 
twentieth century. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. 
Hazareesingh, Sudhir. Political Traditions in Modern France. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994. 
Hertz, Frederick. Nationality in History and Politics: A Psychology and Sociology of 
National Sentiment and Nationalism. New York: Humanities Press, 1966. 
. The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History of 
German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. Totowa, New Jersey: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1975. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Hue-Tarn Ho Tai. "Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory." 
The American Historical Review 106 (June 2001): 906-922. 
Iggers, Georg G. The German conception of History: the National Tradition of 
historical thought from Herder to the present. Middletown, Conn: Harper & 
Row, 1983. 
Jarausch, Konrad H. Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany. Princeton 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. 
Jenkins, Brian. Nationalism in France: Class and Nation since 1789. London: 
Routledge, 1990. 
Joll, James. National Histories and National Historians: Some German and English 
Views of the Past. London: German Historical Institute, 1985. 
136 
Jordan, David P. Introduction to Rethinking France: The State, by Pierre Nora. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
Kedourie, Elie. Nationalism. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1960. 
Kelley, Donald R. Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
Kennedy, P.M. "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West: 1900-1970." Journal 
of Contemporary History 8 (January 1973): 77-100. 
Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New 
York: Collier Books, 1944. 
. The Making of the Modern French Mind. New York: Van Norstrand, 1955. 
. The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1965. 
. Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German experience, 1789-1815, 
New York: Van Norstrand, 1967. 
. Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism. New 
York, Macmillan 1946. 
Kritzmann, Lawrence D. Foreword to Rethinking the French Past of Memory: Conflicts 
and Divisions, by Pierre Nora. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
Lambert, Peter. "Paving the 'Peculiar Path': German nationalism and historiography 
since Ranke." In Imagining Nations, ed. Geoffrey Cubitt, 92-111. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998. 
Lawrence, Paul. Nationalism: History and Theory. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Limited, 
2005. 
Meinecke, Frederich. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University, 1970. 
Mosse, George L. The Crisis of German ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third 
Reich. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. 
. The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass 
Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich. New 
York: H. Fertig, 1975. 
137 
Nora, Pierre. "From Lieux de memoire to Realms of Memory," in Rethinking the French 
Past of Memory: Conflicts and Divisions. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996. 
. "General Introduction: Between Memory and History Realms of Memory." 
In Rethinking the French Past of Memory: Conflicts and Divisions. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
. "Lavisse, The Nation's Teacher." In Realms of Memory: The Construction of 
the French Past, Vol. II: Traditions. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997. 
. Rethinking France: The State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
Palti, Elias Jose. "The Nation as a Problem: Historians and the "National Question," 
History and Theory 40 (October, 2001): 324-336. 
Phillipson, Coleman. Alsace-Lorraine: Past, Present, and Future. London: T. F. 
Unwin, 1918. 
Pflanz, Otto. "Nationalism in Europe, 1848-1871." The Review of Politics, 28 (April 
1966): 129-143. 
Rejai, Mostafa, and Cynthia H. Enloe; "Nation-States and State-Nations." International 
Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969): 140-158. 
Schulze, Hagen. States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present. 
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1994. 
Smith, Anthony D. The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about 
Ethnicity and Nationalism. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 
2000. 
. "Nationalism and the Historians." In Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal 
Balakrishnan, 175-198. New York: Verso, 1996. 
. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of 
Nations and Nationalism. New York: Routledge, 1998. 
. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001 
138 
Terrier, Jean. "The Idea of a Republican tradition: Reflections on the debate concerning 
the intellectual foundations of the French Third Republic." Journal of Political 
Ideologies 11 (October 2006): 289-308. 
Thorn, Martin, "Tribes without Nations: the ancient Germans and the history of 
modern France." Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, 23-44. New 
York: Routledge, 1990. 
Wardman, H.W. Ernest Renan: A Critical Biography. London: The Athlone Press, 
1964. 
Woolf, Stuart, ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present: a reader. New York: 
Routledge, 1996. 
139 
